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Abstract
Semantic Mapping of Security Events to Known Attack Patterns
Xiao Ma
In order to provide cyber environment security, analysts need to analyze a large
number of security events on a daily basis and take proper actions to alert their
clients of potential threats. The increasing cyber traﬃc drives a need for a system to
assist security analysts to relate security events to known attack patterns. This thesis
describes the enhancement of an existing Intrusion Detection System (IDS) with the
automatic mapping of snort alert messages to known attack patterns. Our system
relies on three approaches: supplementing snort messages by adding related Common
Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) entities, pre-clustering similar snort messages
before mapping them to attack patterns in Common Attack Pattern Enumeration
and Classiﬁcation (CAPEC) and using Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA) to reduce
the dimension of the feature space. The module has been deployed in our partner
company and when evaluated against the recommendations of two security analysts,
it improved the F-measure of their system from 51.81% to 64.84%.
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With the increasing dependence on computer infrastructure, cyber security has be-
come an essential service for organizations, governments and individuals. Cyber se-
curity refers to the collection of tools, approaches and technologies which are used
to prevent unauthorized behaviour, hacking attacks, denial of service, malware prop-
agation and other anomalies [Schatz et al., 2017]. In order to detect and prevent
harmful behaviour, multiple sensors are typically installed in network infrastructures.
Each sensor is equipped with several security systems, such as Intrusion Detection
Systems (IDS)1 and Assert Detection Tools [Ashoor and Gore, 2011]. These systems
perform network traﬃc analysis in real-time, detect suspicious activities and produce
alert messages. These messages, triggered by suspicious activities, are called security
events. Snort [Roesch et al., 1999] is a widely used lightweight IDS system installed
in many sensors. By capturing and decoding suspicious Transmission Control Pro-
tocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) packets, snort generates short messages regarding
network traﬃc data to facilitate the task of security analysts to recognize suspicious
behaviours and act accordingly [Roesch et al., 1999]. Figure 1 shows seven examples
of snort messages.
Once a software vulnerability or weakness is identiﬁed, it constitutes very useful
information for security analysts. It is therefore inventoried, classiﬁed and made pub-
licly available in large repositories such as the U.S. National Vulnerability Database
1It is a device or an application which monitors a network or system malicious activities or policy
violations, reporting to an administrator.
1
1. FILE-OTHER XML exponential entity expansion attack attempt
2. FILE-IDENTIFY RealPlayer skin ﬁle attachment detected
3. SQL generic sql exec injection attempt - GET parameter
4. FILE-OTHER XML exponential entity expansion attack attempt
5. MALWARE-OTHER Win.Exploit.Hacktool suspicious ﬁle download
6. BROWSER-PLUGINS MSN Setup BBS 4.71.0.10 ActiveX object access
7. BROWSER-IE Microsoft Internet Explorer asynchronous code execution attempt
Figure 1: Examples of 7 snort messages
Figure 2: Example of a CAPEC Attack Pattern
(NVD) [Division, 2017], Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) [MITRE, 2017b]
and Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classiﬁcation (CAPEC) [MITRE, 2017a].
For example, Figure 2 shows an attack pattern in CAPEC. This pattern shows the
typical scenario of a network attack via an XML Entity Expansion. The pattern is
composed of several ﬁelds that describe the vulnerability in natural language. These
software vulnerability repositories constitute vital information for security analysts as
they can be used to verity if the snort messages describing current network activities
seem to correspond to known attack patterns.
Recognizing suspicious behaviours from snort messages is a diﬃcult task as the
messages are short and contain very little natural language. For example, the ﬁrst
snort message in Figure 1 only contains 7 tokens. Thus, today this task is still mostly
performed by human security experts. After security analysts from our industrial
2
partner2 analyzed the ﬁrst snort message, they associated it to the CAPEC attack
pattern of Figure 2. This allowed them to extract the corresponding solutions speciﬁed
in the Solutions and Mitigations ﬁeld in the attack pattern and communicate it
to their clients.
Because of the increasing volume of network traﬃc, the workload of security an-
alysts has become much heavier and the possibility of not detecting a security risk
has become critical. In order to allow security analysts to better assess risks, the
automatic mapping of security events to known attack patterns is desired. The goal
of this thesis is to propose an automatic method to map snort messages,
as shown in Figure 1, to attack patterns as shown in Figure 2.
1.2 Problem Statement
This thesis is the result of an industrial collaboration with the company Above Secu-
rity. The company uses a proprietary Security Information and Event Management
(SIEM) system to assist security analysts. Figure 3 illustrates a typical SIEM system
workﬂow. As [Scarabeo et al., 2015] describes, the SIEM captures security events in
the so-called collection layer, and uses pre-deﬁned rules stored in a knowledge base
through the intelligence layer. Each security event is matched by rules in the knowl-
edge base in order to identify sensitive events. Then, security analysts observe the
matching events in the analysis layer and respond to clients by writing reports in the
response layer. With the increasing volume of security events, the daily updates of
the pre-deﬁned rules in the knowledge base has become necessary. However, this task
is usually done in an ad-hoc fashion as there is no standard basis for the deﬁnition of
these rules. Thus, a system which can recommend attack patterns to security ana-
lysts is welcome. The goal of this thesis is to assist security analysts by suggesting the
most appropriate attack patterns corresponding to snort messages using the semantic
similarity between these two natural language descriptions. After an analysis of our
partner’s prototype system, the following two research problems have been identiﬁed:
1. Evaluate the quality of their prototype system (see Chapter 3)
2. Improve the quality of their prototype system, in particular to account for the
small length of snort messages (see Chapters 4, 5 and 6).
2This thesis is the result of a MITACS Accelerate project with the company Above Security.
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Figure 3: Workﬂow of a typical SIEM system
Currently, the average size of security events is quite small so that not much
information can be extracted from them to be used in building automated model
for mapping attacks; whereas attack pattern descriptions are much longer. For
instance, the ﬁrst snort alert message in Figure 1 only has 7 tokens but the size
of the corresponding CAPEC entry is 268 tokens (see Figure 2). The diﬀerence
in length between snort messages and attack patterns signiﬁcantly reduces the
eﬀectiveness of standard semantic similarity measures.
1.3 Contribution
This thesis makes four major contributions:
1. We propose to use standard evaluation metrics to evaluate the quality of the
baseline system and our enhanced system. This is described in Chapter 3 and
in [Ma et al., 2018].
In addition, we investigated three approaches to address the issue of the short
size of snort messages and improve the performance of our partner’s existing
mapping system.
2. Supplementing snort messages by adding related Common Vulnerabilities and
Exposures (CVE) entities (see Chapter 4).
3. Pre-clustering similar snort messages before mapping them to attack patterns in
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classiﬁcation (CAPEC) (see Chap-
ter 5 [Ma et al., 2018]).
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4. Using Latent Semantic Analysis to reduce the dimension of the feature space as
well as ﬁnding similar semantic descriptions between snort messages and attack
patterns in CAPEC (see Chapter 6).
The overall contribution of this thesis is to propose a method to decrease the
workload of security analysts via suggesting better quality attack patterns in CAPEC
for each security event. We evaluated our enhanced system against a gold-standard
created by two security analysts. The original system achieved an F-measure of only
51.81%. Through our enhancements, the F-measure improved to 64.57%. Our partner
company was satisﬁed with the enhanced system and deployed it into production.
1.4 Thesis Outline
In this chapter, we motivated our work and described the problems addressed by
our research. The rest of the thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 presents
an overview of previous work, including the three most used public vulnerability
repositories, the ArkAngel system currently used in our partner organization and
various techniques to compute sentence similarity in the ﬁeld of natural language
processing. Chapter 3 introduces the evaluation metrics used to evaluate the current
system and the methodology we used to evaluate its mapping quality. Based on this
evaluation, Chapters 4, 5 and 6 respectively present our experiments to enhance the




As shown in Figure 3, in a typical Security Information and Event Management
(SIEM) system, the intelligence layer is responsible for identifying suspicious be-
haviours. Typically, pre-deﬁned rules and scripts written by experienced security
analysts are used to match security events to known risks. However, with the sig-
niﬁcant increase of network traﬃc, these pre-deﬁned rules need to be maintained on
a daily basis and the workload of security analysts has become much heavier. To
address these issues, security analysts in our partner company, Above Security, de-
veloped an intelligent system to automatically map security events to attack patterns
in the CAPEC repository (see Section 2.2.1).
In this chapter, we present three widely used public vulnerability repositories in
Section 2.1; while Section 2.2 describes the workﬂow of the SIEM system in our part-
ner company. Section 2.3 presents the most common sentences similarity measures
used in natural language process (NLP), based on string similarity and semantic
similarity.
2.1 Public Repositories of Known Vulnerabilities
Over the years, several public known vulnerability repositories have been developed
in the ﬁeld of cyber security. This section describes three of the most widely used
vulnerability repositories: Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE), National
Vulnerability Database (NVD) and Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Clas-
siﬁcation (CAPEC).
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Figure 4: Example of a CVE Entity
2.1.1 Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
In the 1990s, with the rapid development of computer infrastructure and network
facilities, the security of cyber environments became a serious concern. In order to
provide protection for their infrastructure, many organizations built their own secu-
rity vulnerability database products to record known vulnerabilities [MITRE, 2017b].
Each organization used their own regulations and patterns to record software weak-
nesses so that signiﬁcant variations existed among these products. This lead to serious
issues of cross-product consistency and interoperability. In 1999, in order to address
these problems, the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) was launched
by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and to standardize the recording of
security vulnerabilities [MITRE, 2017b].
In the CVE, the smallest unit is the entity. Each entity records a single known
vulnerability and all the entities in the same year are recorded in the order that they
were identiﬁed. Each entity is composed of a CVE ID, a brief description of the vul-
nerability and references to their initial announcement. Figure 4 shows an example of
a CVE entity representing the SQL Injection vulnerability. In this entity, CVE-2015-
0919 is the vulnerability ID, followed by its description and references. Currently,
CVE contains a total of 98,375 entities and each entity contains an average of 30 to-
kens. Because of its wide coverage, most computer security consulting companies use
CVE as the known vulnerability repository in order to obtain better vulnerabilities
coverage and security protection.
However, the descriptions in CVE entities have often been criticized as being
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Figure 5: Example of a CWE Entity
too general to guide software developers in writing code without security weak-
nesses [MITRE, 2017b]. In addition, as the CVE has become quite large (with 98,375
entities), it is not easy to refer to its entities because it does not provide a categoriza-
tion of known weaknesses. In order to overcome these two issues, a CVE derivation
product called Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) was launched by MITRE’s
CVE Team in 2005 [MITRE, 2017c]. Each entity in the CWE not only explains the
implication of each software weaknesses in terms of software design, usage of software
framework and software coding, but it also provides code examples which can cause
weaknesses. For example, Figure 5 shows the SQL Injection software weakness in
the CWE. Compared with the entity in CVE (shown in Figure 4), the CWE entity
provides several additional information, such as Relationships, Modes of Introduction,
etc., to describe the SQL Injection weakness. Currently, there are 714 CWE enti-
ties which are categorized based on a variety of criteria, such as the most frequently
searched weaknesses, diﬀerent programming languages weaknesses, etc.
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2.1.2 The National Vulnerability Database
The National Vulnerability Database (NVD) is a U.S. government vulnerability repos-
itory managed by the Computer Security Division of the National Institute of Stan-
dards and Technology (NIST) [NIST, 2017]. It was launched in 2000 under the initial
name of Internet - Categorization of Attacks Toolkit (ICAT) as an enhancement of
CVE. In the NVD, the smallest unit is called a feed and it consists of a CVE entity (see
Section 2.1.1), a ''technical details'' section which links the feed to the CWE entity and
an impact metric. The Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) [FIRST, 2018]
is an open framework which measures the security of the known vulnerabilities. For
instance, Figures 6 and 7 show the impact metrics and the ''technical details'' zone
for the SQL Injection vulnerability (see Figure 4) in an NVD feed. The integration of
CWE and CVSS into CVE entries as an NVD feed provides security analysts detailed
information for each known vulnerability.
Figure 6: Impact Metrics in an NVD Feed
2.1.3 Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classiﬁca-
tion
In addition to the CVE and CWE repositories, a third vulnerability repository has
been released by MITRE, the Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classiﬁca-
tion (CAPEC) [MITRE, 2017a]. CAPEC is a more recent and richer repository than
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Figure 7: Technical Details in an NVD Feed
CVE and CWE. While the CWE only provides a list of software weaknesses, CAPEC
indicates the common steps that hackers typically use to exploit vulnerabilities, and
also provides suggested mitigations for each known software weakness. In CAPEC,
the descriptions of known software weaknesses are called attack patterns. Currently,
CAPEC contains a total of 508 attack patterns represented hierarchically in 9 high
level mechanisms of attack categories. A category in CAPEC is a collection of attack
patterns in common eﬀects or intents. For example, the Inject Unexpected Items cate-
gory contains the Code Inclusion attack pattern, the Command Injection pattern, the
Object Injection pattern, etc. Figure 8 illustrates these 9 categories followed by the
category ID in the parenthesis, such as Collection and Analyze Information, Inject
Unexpected Items, Abuse Existing Functionality, etc. In each category, there are three
kinds of attack patterns:
Meta Attack Pattern
The meta attack pattern is an abstract description of an attack. It describes
a known vulnerability at a high level and does not provide detailed techniques
used in exploiting the vulnerabilities. For example, the Command Injection
attack pattern shown in Figure 9 is a meta attack pattern.
Standard Attack Pattern
The standard attack pattern focuses on describing speciﬁc methodologies used
in an attack. It provides details about a known vulnerability, such as detailed
descriptions, attack steps, exploiting techniques, etc. For instance, in Figure 9,
the SQL Injection and the XML Injection are standard attack patterns.
Detailed Attack Pattern
Compared with meta and standard attack patterns, detailed attack patterns
provide a more speciﬁc descriptions in the attack steps techniques, exploiting
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Figure 8: Categories of Attack Patterns in CAPEC
prerequisites and several code segment samples. In Figure 9 shows, the Blind
SQL Injection is a detailed attack pattern.
These three types of attack patterns are the basis of the hierarchy representation in
CAPEC. For example, Figure 9 illustrates that the SQL Injection software weakness
is a type of Command Injection which itself is a type of the Inject Unexpected Items
category.
Figure 9: Hierarchy of Attack Patterns in CAPEC
In addition, as shown in Figure 10, an attack pattern is described by several
paragraphs. Each paragraph is called a CAPEC ﬁeld. Each pattern is composed
of 15 ﬁelds that are described in natural language. These includes one Summary
ﬁeld, ﬁve Attack Steps Survey ﬁelds, four Attack Steps Identify Functionality ﬁelds,
two Experiments and three Attack Prerequisites ﬁelds. These CAPEC ﬁelds can be
repeated in diﬀerent attack patterns. Thus, in total, CAPEC contains 5,096 ﬁelds of
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Figure 10: Example of an Attack Pattern in CAPEC
natural language descriptions. Each attack pattern contains an average of 268 tokens
and each attack ﬁeld has about 15 tokens.
2.2 ArkAngel
As indicated in Section 1.1, our thesis is the result of a joint work with Above Secu-
rity. Our task was to evaluated and improve the quality of their current SIEM system,
ArkAngel, a Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) system, developed
in house. A SIEM is comprised of a Security Information Management (SIM) system
as well as a Security Event Management (SEM) system [Dobb’s, 2007]. The SIM is
a software running on a computer system to collect and aggregate suspicious secu-
rity logs by using users’ self-deﬁned ﬁlters as well as storing logs into a centralized
repository of security events for trend analysis [Bayuk, 2007]. On the other hand,
the SEM’s purpose is to analyze and capture sensitive contextual information in each
security event stored in a repository, such as the log of usernames, timestamps, loca-
tions, etc. [ZDNet, 2006]. These sensitive contexts provide more clear clues to security
analysts in order to take defensive actions quickly.
As shown in Figure 11, the ArkAngel system ﬁrst collects, selects and aggregates
security logs via pre-deﬁned ﬁlters as well as storing security events into a central
repository. Then, security analysts view security events via a graphical interface,
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identify suspicious events, take proper actions and respond to clients in a timely fash-
ion (within at most 2 hours in the company’s case [Scarabeo et al., 2015]). However,
with the increased demand for computer security, the volume of security logs has
increased substantially and in order to address this issue, an intelligence layer was
developed by our partner company and inserted into the ArkAngel system.
Figure 11: Workﬂow of ArkAngel
Figure 12 shows the workﬂow of the intelligence layer of ArkAngel. The correlation
rules and scripts in the knowledge base are maintained daily by security analysts in
order to recognize security risks in the ﬁlter process. However, with the substantial
increase of security events, two problems were identiﬁed:
1. There is no standard basis for deﬁning the pre-deﬁned rules and scripts
The pre-deﬁned rules and scripts are written by security analysts based on
their analysis experience. Thus, signiﬁcant variations of rules and scripts exist
for the same known vulnerability, which bring diﬃculties to security analysts
analyzing suspicious events based on the short natural language descriptions.
Also, without a standard basis for rule deﬁnitions, it is diﬃcult to ensure that
a new rule or a script will match new security logs.
2. High Maintenance Workload for Security Analysts
With the increasing volume of logs, the workload of knowledge base maintenance
has also increased signiﬁcantly. Security analysts not only need to update the
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Figure 12: Workﬂow of the Intelligence Layer of ArkAngel
existing rules and scripts in the knowledge base, but also need to analyze larger
volumes of logs which are not matched by existing rules in order to identify
novel software weaknesses as well as inserting new rules into the knowledge
base. Thus, the possibility of not detecting a security risk increases.
To address these two issues, security analysts realized that they needed an intelli-
gent system able to map security events to attack patterns with standard descriptions
automatically. To address this issue, a new module called Charibdis was developed
by our partner company.
2.2.1 Charibdis
To address the two issues presented in Section 2.2, our partner company developed
a new module within ArkAngel, Charibdis, which computes the semantic similarity
between short snort messages and attack ﬁelds in CAPEC. Recall from Section 2.1.3
that CAPEC was developed and is maintained by MITRE Corporation (a non-proﬁt
organization) and provides detailed descriptions for each known vulnerability. Thus,
the aim was that the attack ﬁelds would tackle the standard descriptions issue and
the Charibdis would decrease the high workload of security analysts.
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Figure 13: Workﬂow of the Charibdis System
2.2.1.1 System Overview
Charibdis1 is a core module in the intelligence layer of ArkAngel. Its purpose is to
map security events to known attack patterns in Common Attack Pattern Enumera-
tion and Classiﬁcation (CAPEC) (see Section 2.1.3) in order to reduce the workload
of security analysts. Figure 13 shows an overview of the workﬂow of Charibdis.
Charibdis takes as input security events and known attack patterns. Each security
event and attack ﬁeld description is ﬁrst pre-processed through tokenization, removal
of stop words and stemmed using the Snowball Stemmer [Porter, 2001]. Then, uni-
grams, bigrams and trigrams are used as terms. Document frequency (DF) and term
variance (TV) are then used to ﬁlter terms with a high or low frequency. Using term
frequency · inverse document frequency (TF.IDF) and the cosine measure, the simi-
larity between snort messages and each CAPEC ﬁeld is then computed. Finally, the 3
most similar CAPEC ﬁelds that have a similarity greater than a threshold SimT , are
selected and recommended to security analysts. According to [Scarabeo et al., 2015],
based on these 3 best mapped CAPEC ﬁelds, analysts can easily ﬁnd vulnerability
mitigations and respond to clients within 2 hours. The following describes the system
in more details.
1In the Greek mythology, Charibdis was a sea monster that lived in the Strait of Messina and
could create a huge whirlpool by swallowing huge amounts of seawater.
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2.2.1.2 Inputs
The input of the Charibdis system consists of snort alert messages as Security Events
and CAPEC attack ﬁelds as Known Attack Patterns.
1. Snort Alert Messages
Figure 14 shows an example of a snort alert message taken as input. The snort
alert messages are split by semi-colons into three parts. The ﬁrst part (number
7540 in Figure 14) is the ID of the snort alert message in our partner’s company
database. The second part is the description which is composed of the snort rule
name (e.g. SERVER-OTHER indicates that this snort alert message is about the
operations in computer servers). The next words in this snort message make
up the actual description (e.g. the attempt of uploading a large zip ﬁle can
cause a vulnerability). This attempt has been pre-deﬁned by security analysts
in the snort framework conﬁguration process, thus it can be captured by the
snort system. The last part of the snort alert message, "cve, 2015-2331",
indicates that the content of this snort message is highly related to the known
vulnerability in Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (see Section 2.1.1) with
the ID 2015-2331. In the Charibdis system, only the second section (the natural
language description) is used. The ﬁrst part, the snort message ID, will be used
in our work to evaluate the mapping results (see Chapter 3).
Figure 14: Example of Input Snort Alert Message
2. CAPEC Attack Fields
As described in Section 2.1.3, a CAPEC attack pattern is composed of sev-
eral ﬁelds, such as the vulnerability description, exploiting steps, solutions and
mitigations, etc. These ﬁelds provide detailed descriptions for a set of known
vulnerabilities. Instead of using the entire attack pattern in CAPEC as the
entity of known vulnerabilities, Charibdis uses individual attack ﬁelds in each
attack pattern because the descriptions in an attack pattern is too general to
match a speciﬁc security event and the diﬀerence in the length between snort
messages and attack patterns is signiﬁcant. As shown in Figure 15, one attack
ﬁeld contains three components separated by a semi-colon. The number 2057
16
is the attack ﬁeld ID given by the our partner company which is used to evalu-
ate the mapping results (see Chapter 3); the attack step description is the
title of this attack ﬁeld and the rest of words describe the exploit that hackers
may use to hack into the system. Once the attack ﬁelds are mapped, security
analysts can obtain attack patterns and take the proper actions. As indicated
in Section 2.1.3, there are 5,096 CAPEC attack ﬁelds and each ﬁeld is 15 words
on average.
Figure 15: Example of an Input Attack Field From CAPEC
2.2.1.3 Baseline Algorithm
As Figure 13 shows, snort alert messages and attack ﬁelds are pre-processed through
several natural language processing techniques. Below is a brief review of each tech-
nique and an illustrative example for each step. Suppose that we have the snort
messages and CAPEC attack ﬁelds below:
Snort Messages:
d1: BROWSER-FIREFOX Mozilla Firefox IDB use-after-free attempt
d2: SQL 1 = 1 - possible sql injection attempt
CAPEC Attack Fields:
d3: This category is related to the WASC Threat Classification
2.0 item SQL Injection
d4: Use a browser to manually explore the website and analyze
how it is constructed. Many browser’s plug-in are available to
facilitate the analysis or automate the URL discover
1. Tokenization
Given a document, the tokenization process splits the document into a sequence
of tokens. In the baseline system, CAPEC ﬁelds are concatenated after the
snort messages and all of them are ﬁrst split by spaces and punctuation and
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tokens containing numerical information (e.g.Win32) are removed. The remain-
ing tokens are converted to lowercase and put into a list. In the current imple-
mentation, tokenization is made using word tokenize in the Natural Language
Toolkit (NLTK) [Loper and Bird, 2002] written in Python. For example, with
the above documents, the tokenization result would be:
[’browser’, ’firefox’, ’mozilla’, ’firefox’, ’idb’, ’use’,
’after’, ’free’, ’attempt’]
[’sql’, ’possible’, ’sql’, ’injection’, ’attempt’]
[’this’, ’category’, ’is’, ’related’, ’to’, ’the’, ’wasc’,
’threat’, ’classification’, ’item’, ’sql’, ’injection’]
[’use’, ’a’, ’browser’, ’to’, ’manually’, ’explore’,
’the’, ’website’, ’and’, ’analyze’, ’how’, ’it’, ’is’,
’constructed’, ’many’, ’browser’, ’s’, ’plug’, ’in’, ’are’,
’available’, ’to’, ’facilitate’, ’the’, ’analysis’, ’or’,
’automate’, ’the’, ’url’, ’discover’]
2. Stemming
Word stemming is the process of obtaining the base or root of a word. Sev-
eral stemmers are available publicly (e.g. the Porter Stemmer [Porter, 1980],
Lancaster Stemmer [Chris et al., 1990] and Snowball Stemmer [Porter, 2001]).
The baseline system uses Snowball Stemmer [Porter, 2001] and discards single
characters (e.g. the s in the fourth document). After stemming, the sample
documents become:
[’browser’, ’firefox’, ’mozilla’, ’firefox’, ’idb’, ’use’,
’after’, ’free’, ’attempt’]
[’sql’, ’possibl’, ’sql’, ’inject’, ’attempt’]
[’this’, ’categori’, ’is’, ’relat’, ’to’, ’the’, ’wasc’,
’threat’, ’classif’, ’item’, ’sql’, ’inject’]
[’use’, ’a’, browser’, ’to’, ’manual’, ’explor’,
’the’, ’websit’, ’and’, ’analyz’, ’how’, ’it’, ’is’,
’construct’, ’mani’, ’browser’, ’s’, ’plug’, ’in’, ’are’,




An n-gram is a contiguous sequence of n units. In the ﬁeld of NLP, unigrams
refer to single words or characters; bigrams refer to a sequence of two contiguous
words or characters, trigrams refer to a sequence of three contiguous words or
characters, etc. As we will see in Section 4, the baseline Charibdis system
transforms all the snort messages and CAPEC attack ﬁelds into a document-
by-features matrix after removing stop words (e.g. a, an, the, is, are ...) via
the CountVectorizer method in the scikit-learn library [Pedregosa et al., 2011].
A mixture of unigrams, bigrams and trigrams is then used as features. In our
example, the matrix would be:
attempt browser inject sql sql inject ... websit analyz
d1 1 1 1 0 0 ... 0
d2 1 0 1 2 1 ... 0
d3 0 0 1 1 1 ... 0
d4 0 2 0 0 0 ... 1
where the columns (di) represent documents and the rows are the mixture of
n-grams (n ranges from 1 to 3). For example, analysi is an unigram; analysi
autom is a bigram and websit analyz construct is a trigram. In total, these
four documents are converted into 85 features which are sorted in ascending
alphabetic order. Each entry in this matrix is the frequency of the n-gram in
the corresponding documents.
4. Term Variance
Term Variance (TV) is used to ﬁlter out features (n-grams) that either appear
too often or not often enough. TV measures how the frequency of each fea-
ture deviates from the mean. If a feature has a low variance, it means that
it appears in most of the documents (the snort messages and attack ﬁelds).
In this case, very few n-grams are repeated more than once, so the frequency
of most features in one document (one snort message or attack ﬁeld) is one.
In the baseline system, the VarianceThreshold method in the scikit-learn li-
brary [Pedregosa et al., 2011] is used and the value of term variance (TV) is set
to 0.98 which removes features that appear in more than 98% or less than 2%
(1 - 0.98) of the documents. In our example, the features appear at least in one
document (in 25% of the documents) and none exists in all of the documents.
Thus, after term variance ﬁltering, we obtain the same document-by-feature
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matrix. In Chapter 3, we will measure the eﬀect of the term variance on the
baseline system.
5. Document Frequency
Document frequency (DF) refers to the number of documents which contain a
speciﬁc feature. For instance, in our example, there are 4 documents in total
but only 2 documents contain the speciﬁc word happy. Thus, the document
frequency of the feature happy is 2 out of 4. In the baseline Charibdis system,
our partner company set the document frequency (DF) to 40 arbitrarily in the
feature ﬁltering process.
6. Term Frequency - Inverse Document Frequency
Term frequency (TF) is the frequency of the feature which is mostly used as
term weights in the document-by-term matrix. Another most widely weighting
scheme is term frequency ∗ inverse document frequency (tf∗idf) [Salton et al., 1975].
This measure represents how discriminating a term is to represent documents




where N is the total number of documents in the collection and dfi is the doc-
ument frequency of the ith term. The tf ∗ idf measures the relevance of a term
to a document. For example, if a word exists in every document, its idf value is
0 and thus the tf ∗ idf is 0. On the other hand, if a word only appears in 50%
of the documents, its idf is 0.3 (greater than 0) which means that this word is
more discriminating. Thus, tf ∗ idf is widely used as term weights in order to
represent the relevance of a term. The TF.IDF matrix in our example would
be:
attempt browser inject sql sql inject ... websit analyz
d1 0.30 0.30 0 0 0 ... 0
d2 0.30 0 0.30 0.60 0.30 ... 0
d3 0 0 0.30 0.30 0.30 ... 0
d4 0 0.60 0 0 0 ... 0.60
7. Cosine Similarity
Cosine similarity measures the similarity between two documents by calculating
the cosine value of the angle between the two document vectors (for example, one









Figure 16: Example of Cosine Similarity
is 1 whereas if two documents are orthogonal, their similarity is 0. Thus, the
value range of the cosine similarity is within [0, 1]. In this case, the normalized
inner product of the snort message vectors and the CAPEC ﬁeld vectors is the
similarity between these two documents, which is deﬁned as:
Sim( snort, field) = snort · field =
∑n








where wi snort and wi field are the term weights in the snort messages and the
CAPEC ﬁelds and n is the number of terms in the vocabulary. In our example,
suppose that the snort message d2 and the CAPEC ﬁeld d3 are represented
using only the 2 features inject and sql and we use term frequency as term
weights, then their cosine similarity is:
Sim snort, field =
1× 2 + 1× 1√
5×√2 = 0.95
Figure 16 shows the cosine similarity between the 2 documents represented by
inject and sql.
Based on these pre-processing techniques, Charibdis reads snort messages and
CAPEC ﬁelds, tokenizes them, ﬁlters unimportant features through document fre-
quency and term variance, and transforms them into a document-by-terms matrix.
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Then, each term frequency is replaced by its TF.IDF value calculated by the Tﬁdf-
Transformer scikit-learn method. Finally the cosine similarity method measures the
similarity between each snort messages and attack ﬁelds and the 3 most similar
CAPEC ﬁelds are returned for each snort message. These mapping results are ﬁ-
nally recommended to security analysts.
2.3 Sentence Similarity
The workﬂow and the algorithm of the baseline Charibdis system is based on sentence
similarity, a standard problem in natural language processing (NLP). Given two sen-
tences, the task of measuring their similarity follows two main approaches. One is to
consider only string similarity and the other is to consider the actual meaning of the
sentences [Gomaa and Fahmy, 2013]. In this section, we describe related works using
these these two approaches.
2.3.1 String Similarity
Computing sentence similarity at the string level is related to lexical similarity as it
does not consider the meaning of the sentences. In natural language processing, two
models can be used to represented input text: character-based models or word-based
models.
2.3.1.1 Character-based Models
Character sequence similarity is a type of lexical similarity. A sequence of characters
can be a word in natural language or a data record in a database. Since the 1960s,
several approaches have been introduced to calculate character sequence similarity.
Let us describe several well-known algorithms.
[Levenshtein, 1966] describes a method called the edit distance. It quantiﬁes the
similarity between two character sequences by counting the minimum number of
steps which are needed to transform one string into another through insertion,
deletion and substitution of characters. The principle is that the fewer steps
are needed to transform, the more similar the two strings are. Today, the edit
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distance is wildly used in spell checking applications (e.g. appel is more likely
to be appeal than apple).
[Allison and Dix, 1986] developed an algorithm called longest-common-subsequence
(LCS) based on dynamic programming. The method captures the longest com-
mon character sequence from two similar strings without the consecutive re-
striction. For instance, given two strings ”DACBGHZ” and ”ACBEJQGH”,
the longest common subsequence is ”ACBGH”. Similarly, [Gusﬁeld, 1997] pro-
posed an algorithm to extract the longest common substring which is restricted
by continuity conditions. In the previous example, the longest common sub-
string is ”ACB”.
[Jaro, 1989] proposed a novel algorithm to measure the similarity between two
strings. Given two strings S1 and S2, the similarity is deﬁned as:
simj(S1, S2) =
{
0 if m = 0
1
3
× ( m|S1| + m|S2| + m − tm ) otherwise
where m is the number of matching characters and t is half the number of
transpositions. In the Jaro distance, characters are considered matching only if





- 1. For example, for the
string S1: ”MARTHA” and S2: ”MARHTA”, the value of m, t, |S1| and |S2|
are:
1. m is 6 because there are six matching characters.
2. Characters ’T’ and ’A’ need to switch position in order to match. Thus, t
is 2.
3. The length of S1 and S2 are both six.










[Winkler, 1990] added a new feature to the Jaro distance measure, the preﬁx
scale p. In [Winkler, 1990], the similarity of two string S1 and S2 is deﬁned as:
simw(S1, S2) = simj(S1, S2) + (l × p × (1 − simj(S1, S2)))
where simj is the Jaro similarity of the two input strings S1 and S2; l is the
length of common characters at the start of the two strings and up to four char-
acters; p is a constant scaling factor for the common preﬁxes score adjustment
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which does not exceed 0.25. Normally, the value of p is 0.1. Thus, for the
previous example, the Jaro-Winkler similarity is:
0.94 + (3 × 0.1 × (1 − 0.94)) = 0.96
These algorithms score string similarity through the number of common charac-
ters. However, in natural language processing, words are more natural units than
characters. In next section, word-based similarity metrics are introduced.
2.3.1.2 Word-Based Model
Instead matching characters, words are an important respect to consider in the sim-
ilarity measurement. In this section, we describe several word-based techniques to
measure string similarity.
1. [Monge et al., 1996, Monge and Elkan, 1997] proposed a simple but eﬀective
word similarity metric, called Monge-Elkan. The algorithm ﬁrst tokenizes the
input strings into tokens and scores the token pairs from each string by some in-
ternal similarity, such as the edit distance or the Jaro-Winkler similarity. Then,
word pairs with the highest similarity score are picked out; their scores are
summed up and normalized as the similarity of these input strings. The deﬁni-







where S1 and S2 are two input strings, |S1| and |S2| are the number of to-
kens in S1 and S2, sim
′
(S1, S2) is measured by the Smith-Waterman algo-
rithm [Smith and Waterman, 1981]. As with the previous measures, the lower
the edit distance, the more similar these strings are. Thus, the internal similarity
sim
′
(S1i, S2j) = 1 - dSmith−Waterman(S1i, S2j) 2. For instance, the Monge-Elkan




× (max(1 − dSW (A1, B1), 1 − dSW (A1, B2), 1 − dSW (A1, B3)
+ max(1 − dSW (A2, B1), 1 − dSW (A2, B2), 1 − dSW (A2, B3)
2Here, we use dSW to represent dSmith−Waterman
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+ max(1 − dSW (A3, B1), 1 − dSW (A3, B2), 1 − dSW (A3, B3))
= 1
3
× (max(1 − dSW (I, Y ou), 1 − dSW (I, Love), 1 − dSW (I, Him)
+ max(1 − dSW (Love, Y ou), 1 − dSW (Love, Love), 1 − dSW (Love, Him)
+ max(1 − dSW (Y ou, Y ou), 1 − dSW (Y ou, Love), 1 − dSW (Y ou, Him))
= 1
3
× (max(1 − 3
3
, 1 − 4
4
, 1 − 3
3
)
+ max(1 − 3
4
, 1 − 0, 1 − 4
4
)
+ max(1 − 0, 1 − 3
4





× (0 + 1 + 1) = 0.67
2. N-Grams
In natural language processing, n-grams is a sequence of n consecutive tokens.
Unigrams (n = 1), bigrams (n = 2) and trigrams (n = 3) are widely used to rep-
resent text in a linear fashion. Many NLP applications use n-grams as their basic
units, for example, automatic speech recognition, machine translation and simi-
lar sentences matching. [Lyon et al., 2001] indicates that the number of overlap-
ping bigrams or trigrams derived from two or more independent texts should be
quite small and most of the trigrams should only belong to the document which
provides them, because English follows the principle of Zipf’s law [Zipf, 2016].
Thus, if two documents contains many co-occurences of bigrams and trigrams,
they are likely to be similar. [Barro´n-Ceden˜o and Rosso, 2009] uses n-grams,
with n ranging from 1 to 5 to represent two comparable documents, and the
containment measure [Broder, 1997] to detect plagiarism with references. The
deﬁnition of the containment measure is:
C(si | d) = |N(si)| ∩ |N(d)||N(si)|
where |N(d)| is the set of n-grams in the reference document and |N(si)| is
the set of n-grams in the ith sentence of the suspicious document, C(si | d) is
the percentage of overlapping n-grams. [Barro´n-Ceden˜o and Rosso, 2009] ﬁrst
splits the suspicious documents into sentences and represents each sentence by
n-grams. On the other hand, the reference document is represented via n-grams
directly. For each sentence in the suspicious document, if the percentage of over-
lapping n-grams is greater than a given threshold, the sentence is considered
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plagiarised from the reference documents. The best results in plagiarism detec-
tion was achieved using bigrams and trigrams because these n-grams are not
only short enough to handle text meaning but also long enough to represent
each sentences.
3. Vector-Space Models
In order to calculate the sentence similarity based on the co-occurence of n-
grams, the vector-space model [Salton and McGill, 1986] is often used. This
model converts a document into a term-by-document matrix. Each entry in
this matrix is the weight of the corresponding term. The weight of the terms
can be their frequency in each document or some other weighting scheme, such
as TF.IDF (see Section 2.2.1.3). For instance, suppose the two sentences S1
and S2:
S1: ”This robot can speak English”,
S2: ”That robot can speak French”
After tokenizing these two sentences into unigrams, Table 1 shows the corre-










Table 1: Example of a Term-by-Document Matrix
4. Similarity Metrics
Based on the term-by-document matrix, a variety of similarity measures are
widely used to measure the similarity between two sentences.
(a) Euclidean Distance
The Euclidean Distance is a simple distance metrics. Given two points P
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where Pi and Qi are the coordinates of points P and Q in the ith dimension.
In the document similarity measure, points P and Q represents two dif-
ferent documents and the corresponding coordinates are the term weights





(Thiss1 − Thiss2)2 + (robots1 − robots2)2 + ... + (Frenchs1 − Frenchs2)2
=
√
1 + 0 + 0 + 0 + 1 + 1 + 1 = 2
(b) Jaccard Coeﬃcient
The Jaccard Coeﬃcient calculates the similarity of two sentences by the
number of common tokens divided by the union of the tokens from the two
sentences [Jaccard, 1901]. In the previous example, the Jaccard similarity
is:
Simj(S1, S2) =







When sentences are represented as vectors, their similarity can be calcu-
lated through the cosine value of the angle of two vectors. Given two
sentences S1 and S2, the cosine value is the product of the vectors S1 and
S1 divided by the normalized lengths of two vectors. The deﬁnition is:
Simcosine( S1, S2) =
S1 · S2
|S1||S2|
where S1 and S2 are n dimensional vectors over the term set T = {t1, t2, ..., tn}.
Each value of the vector is the term frequency or any other term weight.
For instance, if we use term frequency in the previous example, the cosine
similarity is:
Simcosine( S1, S2) =
1 × 0 + 1 × 1 + ... + 0 × 1√




The Cosine Similarity is independent of document length, because it normalizes
the length of each document vector [Huang, 2008]. For example, if unigrams
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are used to represent these two sentences
S1: I like computer science
S2: computer science is my major
the cosine similarity is 0.52. If we extend S1 to I like computer science I like
computer science and keep S2 as before, the similarity is also 0.52 even though
the S1 is much longer. Thus, the Cosine Similarity is widely used in information
retrieval.
Lexical similarity measures work very well when two documents contain many
common lexical units. In addition, in order to improve their precision, many pre-
processing methods are used, such as stemming, stop-words removal, using diﬀerent
term weights. However, these lexical-based metrics do not take into account the
meaning of words. For instance, the similarity between these two sentences I own a
dog and I have an animal cannot be found by lexical similarity [Mihalcea et al., 2006].
2.3.2 Semantic Similarity
Compared to lexical similarity, semantic similarity takes into account the meaning of
two sentences. This is done through two approaches: knowledge-based and corpus-
based models [Gomaa and Fahmy, 2013].
2.3.3 Knowledge-Based Models
Knowledge-based models make use of taxonomies of concepts. By quantifying the
degree of semantic similarity of words and concepts derived from publicly avail-
able resources, for example WordNet [Miller, 1995], the relatedness between words
can be measured [Mihalcea et al., 2006]. Note that the concept of semantic relat-
edness is more general than semantic similarity as it includes similarity and dis-
similarity [Budanitsky and Hirst, 2006]. In this section, we only consider semantic
similarity and present several word-to-word similarity approaches based on WordNet.
Finally, an approach measuring sentence semantic similarity based on the aggregation
of word-to-word scores is described.
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Figure 17: A Fragment of WordNet Hierarchy
2.3.3.1 WordNet
WordNet is a large lexical database developed by George Miller and colleagues at
Princeton University [Miller, 1995]. It includes nouns, verbs, adjectives and adverbs
which are organized in taxonomic hierarchies. From the root to the leaves, the sense
of words is increasingly speciﬁc. The basic unit in WordNet is called a synset which
groups semantic related words into distinct sets. In total, there are 117,000 synsets
interlinked with each other via several types of semantic relations. Figure 17 shows
a fragment of the WordNet hierarchical levels. In nouns and verbs synsets, the hy-
peronymy / hyponymy (also called is-a) relation and the meronymy / holonymy (also
called is-a-part-of) relation are most frequently used. As an example, Electric Car is
a Car and Car Window is a part of Car (see Figure 17). In addition, the relations
in adjective synsets induce synonymy / antonymy (e.g. beautiful and attractive, wet
and dry) and only a few adverbs are organized in WordNet which are derived from the
adjectives morphological aﬃxation. One WordNet restriction is that synset relations
are only deﬁned for words with the same part-of-speech. [Miller, 1995]
2.3.3.2 Word-To-Word Semantic Similarity
Based on the WordNet public lexical resource, several word-to-word similarity ap-
proaches have been proposed [Pedersen et al., 2004].
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[Wu and Palmer, 1994] calculate the similarity between two words in the Word-





where w1 and w2 are two words and the depth value is the number of nodes
between a word and the least common subsumer. For instance, the similarity
between Mountain Bike and Jeep in Figure 17 is:




[Resnik, 1995] argues that evaluating semantic similarity through counting the
nodes in WordNet should not be used, because the real distance between two
linked nodes varies widely. For example, rabbit ears is a hyponymy of television
antenna in WordNet. To address this problem, Resnik proposes an alternative
semantic similarity metric in WordNet. He ﬁrst explains the deﬁnition of infor-
mation content.
IC(w1) = − log(Pw1)
where Pw1 is the probability of encountering w1 in WordNet. [Resnik, 1995]
argues that the probability of encountering a hyperonym is larger than a hy-
ponym because the meaning of a hyperonym is more general. If only one root
node exists in the taxonomy, then Proot is 1. Based on the information content,
the deﬁnition of the similarity between two words is:
Simres(w1, w2) = IC(LCS(w1, w2))
Based on the information content and Resnik’s approach, [Jiang and Conrath, 1997]
deﬁnes word-to-word similarity as:
Simjiang(w1, w2) =
1
IC(w1) + IC(w2) − 2 × IC(LCS(w1, w2))
One year later, [Lin et al., 1998] evaluates concept similarity in WordNet based
on the information content:
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Simlin(w1, w2) =
2 × IC(LCS(w1, w2))
IC(w1) + IC(w2)
[Leacock and Chodorow, 1998] deﬁne the similarity between two words via the
shortest path between them in the WordNet hierarchy, normalized by twice the
maximum depth of these two words.
Simlch(w1, w2) = − log( length
2 × D )
where w1 and w2 are two comparison words, length is the shortest path be-
tween them and D is the maximum depth of these two words in WordNet. In
the previous example, the similarity is:
Simlch(Mountain Bike, Jeep) = − log( 5
2 × 3) = 0.08
The availability of lexical resources makes the computation of word-to-word simi-
larity metrics straightforward; whereas text-to-text similarity measure still mainly re-
lies on the conventional vector-space models (see Section 2.3.1.2). [Mihalcea et al., 2006]
introduces an approach which measures text similarity based on word-to-word simi-
larity scores. Given two input text fragments T1 and T2, these two texts are tokenized
into words after removing punctuation and stop words. Then, each word w1 in seg-
ment T1 is compared with every word that shares the same part-of-speech in T2 in
order to seek a word w2 which has the maximum similarity with word w1 through a
word-to-word similarity approaches (see Section 2.3.3.2). In this step, adjectives and
adverbs whose similarity cannot be obtained from WordNet (see Section 2.3.3.1) are
evaluated via identical occurrence. Next, the same process is used for each word in
T2 to determine the maximum similar word in T1. Finally, each word similarity in
each text fragment is weighted by the word idf value, summed up and normalized by










w∈T2 maxSim(w, T1) ∗ idf(w)∑
w∈{T2} idf(w)
))
where idf(w) is derived from the British National Corpus (a 100 million words cor-
pus) [Clear, 1993]. The similarity score is between 0 and 1, where 1 indicates the
two text segments are identical. To evaluate this measure, the Microsoft paraphrase
corpus [Dolan et al., 2004], which contains 5,801 tagged text pairs, were evaluated
and achieved F-measure of 81.3% compared to the vector-space model of 75.3%.
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2.3.4 Corpus-Based Model
Vector-space models rely on words co-occurrences to determine the similarity score
between texts while knowledge-based models depend a knowledge database in order
to compute semantic similarity. However, corpus-based models extract similar words
and topics from large corpora. One of the most popular semantic similarity techniques
in corpus-based model is Latent Semantic Analysis [Landauer and Dumais, 1997].
2.3.4.1 Latent Semantic Analysis
The basic idea of latent semantic analysis (LSA) is that semantically similar words
and phrases will occur in similar meaning contexts [Gomaa and Fahmy, 2013]. Thus,
LSA focuses on weighting words based on their importance for each potential mean-
ing (also called latent topics) in a large corpus. Given a term-by-document matrix
which represents a corpus, LSA tries to convert the matrix to a term-by-latent top-
ics matrix using singular value decomposition (SVD). SVD is a well-known matrix
decomposition method. The principle of SVD is that any rectangular matrix can be
decomposed into the product of three matrices:
C = UΣV T
where C is the original term-by-document matrix, U and V T are two orthogonal
matrices and any two distinct rows in matrix U are orthogonal and any two columns in
matrix V T are orthogonal, Σ is a square diagonal matrix and each value in the diagonal
are eigenvalues, which indicate how important this latent topic is. Unimportant latent
topics (with lower eigenvalues) will be ignored and matrix dimension will be reduced.
Instead of discarding the words in the omitted dimensions, SVD projects these words
to the saved dimensions which highlights the text similarity and distinguish unrelated
corpora [Schu¨tze et al., 2008]. For example, suppose three sentences are as following:
S1: Machine learning is super fun.
S2: Python is super super cool.
S3: Data science is fun.
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First, these sentences are converted into a term-by-document matrix after remov-
ing stop words. Each entry in the matrix is the term frequency in the sentences.
Thus, we can have the following normalized matrix.
S1 S2 S3
cool 0 0.4 0
data 0 0 0.6
fun 0.5 0 0.6
learning 0.5 0 0
machine 0.5 0 0
python 0 0.4 0
science 0 0 0.6
super 0.5 0.8 0
After we decompose it and reduce the dimension from 8 (8 features) to 2, the
normalized latent topic matrix is:
S1 S2 S3
cool 0.2 0.3 0
data 0.2 0 0.5
fun 0.5 0.1 0.6
learning 0.3 0.2 0.1
machine 0.3 0.2 0.1
python 0.2 0.3 0
science 0.2 0 0.5
super 0.7 0.8 0
In this example, the default number of latent topics is eight because there are eight
features in these three sentences. After we reduced the dimensions to two, several
unnecessary topics are collapsed and the similarity between two similar sentences is
highlighted. If we measure the similarity between S1 and S2 in both the term-by-
document matrix and the latent topics matrix, we can easily observe the similarity
enhancement provided by LSA.
Simdefault(S1, S2)
= 0× 0.4 + 0× 0 + 0.5× 0 + 0.5× 0 + 0.5× 0 + 0× 0.4
+ 0× 0 + 0.5× 0.8 = 0.4
Simlatent(S1, S2)
= 0.2× 0.3 + 0.2× 0 + 0.5× 0.1 + 0.3× 0.2 + 0.3× 0.2
+ 0.2× 0.3 + 0.2× 0 + 0.7× 0.8 = 0.85
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As we can see, although there are only two common words between S1 and S2
(super and is), the similarity of these two sentences has been doubled after using LSA
because both sentences express similar meaning.
2.3.4.2 Other Similarity Measures
In addition to the latent semantic analysis, other semantic similarity approaches have
been proposed. Based on large corpora, term pairwise similarity matrix and relevant
documents can be extracted and used in measuring semantic similarity.
1. [Royer, 2005] proposed an approach called Generalized Latent Semantic Anal-
ysis (GLSA) which is based on latent semantic analysis and the use of large
corpora. Given a collection of documents C with vocabulary V and a large cor-
pusW , a term-by-document matrixD is constructed based on the documents C.
Then, a word-by-word pairwise similarity matrix is build for vocabulary V using
the point-wise mutual information measure [Manning and Schu¨tze, 1999] from
the large corpus W . Each entry in the matrix is the similarity weight between
a word in the row and a word in the column. Next, the matrix UT is obtained
through reducing the pairwise matrix dimensions to k by SVD decomposition
(see Section 2.3.4.1). Finally, the document vector Dˆ is calculated through the
product of the UT matrix and the term-by-document D (Dˆ = UTD). Columns
in Dˆ represent documents in k dimensions which can be used to measure doc-
uments similarity using conventional metrics. Compared with LSA (see Sec-
tion 2.3.4.1), GLSA focuses on the operation of word-by-word pairwise matrix
and measures similarity over the document vectors matrix.
2. Traditional similarity metrics cannot perform well with short text snippets. For
example, the cosine similarity between artiﬁcial intelligence and AI is zero even
though their meaning is the same. To address this issue, [Sahami and Heilman, 2006]
introduced a novel method, called kernel function, where the similarity between
these two phrases is computed as 83.1%. Assume that the short snippet is x,
and the procedure is:
(a) Search for x using the Google search engine.
(b) For each retrieved document (at most n documents), extract context de-
scriptions of x and build context vectors vi with TF.IDF weight for each
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description.
(c) Truncate each vector by selecting the m highest TF.IDF weight terms.












In addition, several ad-hoc parameters are used. In order to obtain precise
TF.IDF value, [Sahami and Heilman, 2006] computed documents N and df
from a large sample of web documents which are not limited to the n retrieved
documents in the algorithm. For the context description extraction, a 1,000
characters (the total number of token characters) window centered at the orig-
inal snippets is used. In the terms selection process, setting m = 50 can result
in a good trade-oﬀ between similarity value and program eﬃciency.
In character-based models, all the algorithms measure similarity by calculating
the number of common characters between two words or steps used to change one
word to another. Similarly, when measuring the similarity between two sentences,
the number of common tokens are used. These tokens can be represented in many
ways, such as n-grams, words, etc. The advantage of character-based models and
word-based models is that they are easy to understand and use eﬃciently; however
these models cannot measure the semantic similarity between sentences. In addition,
by using statistics and analyzing large quantities of corpora, several algorithms (e.g.:
LSA, GLSA) are able to estimate the semantic similarity between sentences. However,
unlike string similarity methods, these algorithms are not straightforward and need
corpora.
In this chapter, we have presented an overview of previous work on the three widely
used public vulnerability repositories. We then described the workﬂow of the current
Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) system and the intelligence
component, Charibdis. Finally, in Section 2.3, we described the most common similar
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sentence mapping in terms of string similarity and semantic similarity. In Chapter 3,




In [Scarabeo et al., 2015], the baseline Charibdis system (see Section 2.2.1) was only
evaluated in terms of coverage. This measure, called Mapping Rating, evaluated
the number of snort messages that were matched to at least one CAPEC ﬁeld. In
Section 3.1, we describe this initial evaluation metric and in Section 3.2 we explain
how we evaluated the quality of the recommended ﬁelds in terms of precision, recall
and F-Measure.
3.1 Initial Evaluation
As described in Section 2.2.1.3, the information provided in an attack pattern is too
general to be mapped to a speciﬁc security event and the diﬀerence in length between
security events (8 tokens on average) and attack patterns (268 tokens on average)
is quite signiﬁcant, thus attack ﬁelds are mapped to security events in the baseline1
system. Recall from Section 2.2.1, that because the average length of security events is
8 tokens, not much information can be extracted from them to be used in building an
automated model for detecting the attacks. In addition, CAPEC attack ﬁelds have on
average 15 tokens, twice as many tokens than security events. In order to supplement
more information for security events and equalize the length of snort messages and
attack ﬁelds, two security experts in our partner company wrote descriptions for each
snort rule name (see Section 2.2.1.1). In this section, we ﬁrst describes the snort rule
name expansion followed by the introduction of the mapping rate.
1We use the term baseline to refer to the original Charibdis system (see Section 2.2.1).
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3.1.1 Snort Rule Name Description
To overcome the issue of short snort messages, security experts at Above Security an-
alyzed 32,246 diﬀerent snort alert messages and identiﬁed 68 unique snort names. For
example, Table 2 shows two messages that share the same snort name (INDICATOR-
SCAN). For each snort name, two analysts wrote a description of about 7 words.
Table 3 shows the expansion of 4 such terms. By replacing snort names in the orig-
inal snort messages with their longer descriptions, the length of each snort message
increased from an average of 8 words to an average of 15 words.
Snort ID Snort Content
6790 INDICATOR-SCAN inbound probing for IPTUX messenger port
16800 INDICATOR-SCAN cybercop os PA12 attempt
796 FILE-IDENTIFY JPG ﬁle attachment detected
28342 SERVER-WEBAPP Oracle iSQLPlus username overﬂow attempt
Table 2: Example of Same Rule Name
Rule Name Expanded Description
INDICATOR-SCAN Indications of scanning in network traﬃc
FILE-IDENTIFY File extension ﬁle magic or header found in the traﬃc
SERVER-WEBAPP Web based applications on servers
FILE-FLASH Flash ﬁles
Table 3: Example of Snort Rule Name Expansion
3.1.2 Mapping Rate
In [Scarabeo et al., 2015], Charibdis was evaluated based on the mapping rate of
32,246 snort alert messages (see Figure 14) and 5,096 CAPEC attack ﬁelds (see Fig-
ure 15). As shown in Figure 18, 32,246 snort messages were ﬁrst extended by the
snort rule name description (see Section 3.1.1). As indicated in Section 2.2.1.3, all
of the attack ﬁelds were tokenized, stemmed, and indexed into a document-by-term
matrix. After removing features whose document frequency (DF) is lower than 40,
the number of features, a mixture of unigrams, bigrams and trigrams, decreased from
192,586 to 2,213. Thus, the shape of the document-by-term matrix is 37,342 × 2,213
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Figure 18: Detailed Workﬂow of the Original Evaluation of the Baseline System
= 37,342). Then, the term variance (TV) ﬁltered out high and low frequency features
and only 10% of the n-grams were kept. Finally, term frequencies are replaced by
TF.IDF values in each matrix entry, the cosine similarity measured the similarity
between each snort message and each attack ﬁeld and the 3 most similar ﬁelds were
chosen as results. Figure 18 illustrates an example of snort message number 31,995
mapped to CAPEC ﬁelds number 1,285, 1,278 and 16813 respectively with a cosine
measure of 0.81. The context of these four documents are given as follows.
Snort Messages
31995: FILE-FLASH Adobe Flash Player movie signed integer memory
corruption attempt
CAPEC Fields
1285: Use an automated tool to record the variables passed to a ﬂash ﬁle.
1852: Using a browser or an automated tool an attacker records all in-
stances of HTML documents that have embedded Flash movies. If there
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is an embedded Flash movie he lists how to pass global parameters to the
Flash movie from the embedding object.
1278: Use an automated tool to record all instances of URLs which have
embedded Flash movies and list the parameters passing to the Flash movie
In baseline system, all CAPEC ﬁelds with a positive similarity (SimMIN > 0) with
a snort message S were considered as valid mappings for message S. Otherwise, S
is not matched to any ﬁeld. To measure the system, [Scarabeo et al., 2015] used a
metric called mapping rate (MR) which measures the number of snort messages that
were matched to at least one CAPEC ﬁeld out of the total number of snort messages.
MR =
Number of Matched Snort Messages
Total Snort Messages
In their experiments with the baseline system, the number of snort messages that
were matched to at least one attack ﬁeld is 31,906. Thus, the mapping rate (MR) of





Although the MR is high, the quality of the recommended CAPEC ﬁelds was




To evaluate the mapping quality, we created a gold-standard dataset by asking two
cyber security experts to evaluate the quality of the output of the system. The gold-
standard contains the mapping of 3,165 snort messages mapped to at most 6 CAPEC
ﬁelds. This gave rise to 16,826 tagged mappings. Each mapping was annotated by
the two experts with one of three levels of quality:
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1. Correct
If the security analysts could use the mapped CAPEC ﬁeld directly as a solution,
this mapping result was evaluated as correct. In the gold-standard dataset, the
correct mappings were labelled as ’1’.
2. Acceptable
If the security analysts could generate a client solution by referring to the
mapped CAPEC ﬁeld, this mapping result was considered as acceptable. In
gold-standard dataset, the acceptable mappings were tagged as ’0.5’.
3. Incorrect
If the mapped CAPEC ﬁeld was not useful, this mapping result was labelled as
incorrect. ’0’ was used to represent the incorrect mappings in the gold-standard
dataset.
Table 4 shows three examples of the diﬀerent mapping quality annotations in the
gold-standard dataset. The Snort Message ID and CAPEC Field ID are the sequence
number used to evaluate the mapping result (see Section 2.2.1.2). For instance, the
second example indicates that snort message number 36 was mapped to CAPEC ﬁeld
16,506 and was judged as acceptable by the security experts. Table 5 shows statistics
of the gold-standard. As the table shows, 9,222 mappings were labelled as correct;
5,496 mappings were tagged as acceptable and 2,108 mappings were judged incorrect.
Based on the gold-standard dataset, several metrics were used.




Table 4: Extract of the Gold-Standard Dataset
3.2.2 Evaluation Metrics
The output generated by the baseline system was evaluated against the gold-standard
(see Section 3.2.1). As shown in Figure 5, the gold-standard only contains the evalua-
tion of 16,826 mappings. However, with 32,246 snort messages mapped to a maximum
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Table 5: Statistics of the Gold-standard Built by Two Cyber Security Analysts
of 6 CAPEC ﬁelds, the total number of possible mappings is 193,476 (6 × 32,246),
therefore the evaluation of the outputs of the baseline system was made only on the
overlapping answers; mappings provided by the system that were not included in the
gold-standard were therefore not evaluated. For each overlap, three measures were
recorded: Correct Mapping, Acceptable Mapping and Incorrect Mapping, depending
on how the mapping quality was judged in the gold-standard dataset. Following the
advice of our security analysts, recall was deemed more important than precision.
Indeed, in this domain, it is preferable to alert clients too often with false alarms
than to miss potential cyber threats. To account for this, two types of precision were
computed: strict precision (P S) and lenient precision (PL) which are deﬁned as:
Strict Precision: P S = Correct Mappings
(Correct + Acceptable + Incorrect) Mappings
Lenient Precision: PL = (Correct + Acceptable) Mappings
(Correct + Acceptable + Incorrect) Mappings
as well as two types of recall: strict recall (RS) and lenient recall (RL):
Strict Recall: RS = Correct Mappings
Correct + Acceptable + Incorrect
Lenient Recall: RL = (Correct + Acceptable) Mappings
Correct + Acceptable
Finally, we also calculated a series of F-Measures, which are a weighted combination
of precision and recall. F-Measure is deﬁned as Fβ =
(β2 + 1) × P × R
β2 × P + R . If β = 1,
then precision and recall have the same importance; if β < 1, it means that recall
is favored; if β > 1, then precision is more important. In these experiments, we set
the weight beta to 0.5 (F0.5), 1 (F1) and 2 (F2) respectively and also computed two
versions: lenient F-Measures and strict F-Measures. These F-Measures are deﬁned
as:
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Strict F S0.5 =
(0.52 + 1) × PS × RS




(0.52 + 1) × PL × RL
0.52 × PL + RL =
1.25PLRL
0.25PL + RL
Strict F S1 =
(12 + 1) × PS × RS




(12 + 1) × PL × RL
12 × PL + RL =
2PLRL
PL + RL
Strict F S2 =
(22 + 1) × PS × RS




(22 + 1) × PL × RL
22 × PL + RL =
5PLRL
4PL + RL
Table 6 shows the default parameters indicated in Section 3.1.2 that we used to eval-
uate the baseline system. SimMIN represents the minimum similarity threshold to
match messages. With SimMIN = 0, this means that as long as the snort message
and attack ﬁeld are not completely orthogonal, they are considered similar. Expan-
sion indicates the use of snort rule name description to extend snort messages (see
Section 3.1.1). As Table 7 shows, the number of acceptable mapping is quite high as
it accounts for 94% (5,178 / 5,496) of the total acceptable mappings, whereas only 1%
of the correct mappings were found. The PL was 97.96% because of the contribution
of acceptable mappings while the RL was only 35.22%. Table 8 shows that the FL0.5
and FL1 were 72.23% and 51.81% respectively.
System SimMIN DF TV Expansion Nb of Features
Baseline 0 40 0.98 Yes 140
Table 6: Description of Input Parameters in Baseline System
System Number of Mappings Lenient Strict
Correct Acceptable Incorrect PL RL PS RS
Baseline 108 5,178 6 97.96% 35.22% 0.11% 0.07%
Table 7: Precision and Recall of the Baseline System
As we can see, although the mapping rate is 98.94%, the mapping quality is low
because only 1% of the correct mappings were found. In next three chapters, we will














Baseline 72.23% 51.81% 40.40% 0.09% 0.08% 0.07%
Table 8: F-Measure of the Baseline System
In this chapter, we have described the workﬂow of the baseline system and the
attempt of [Scarabeo et al., 2015] to improve it through snort rule expansion. In
addition, we explained how the mapping rate was initially evaluated (see Section 3.1.2)
and how the measurement did not measure the quality of the mapping. We then
described our work to evaluate the quality of the baseline’s output by creating a gold-
standard and using the standard metrics of precision, recall and F-measure. In order
to enhance the performance of the baseline system, the next chapters investigate three
approaches:
1. Feature Selection and Snort Messages Supplement.
2. Pre-clustering Snort Messages.
3. Semantic Mapping by Latent Semantic Analysis.
In the next chapter, we will provide a detailed description of the snort messages
supplement methodology as well as an analysis of the evaluation of the outputs.
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Chapter 4
Feature Selection and Snort
Messages Supplement
Table 7 in Chapter 3 showed that the recall of the baseline system was only 35%. In
order to improve the system performance, we experimented with three approaches:
1. Feature Selection and Snort Messages Supplement.
2. Pre-clustering Snort Messages.
3. Semantic Mapping by Latent Semantic Analysis.
In this chapter, we describe the ﬁrst approach: n-grams feature selection to analyze
the feature distribution and snort messages supplement. Section 4.1 describes our
experiments with the use of a variety of feature sets and their eﬀect on the evalua-
tion of the system. After analyzing the feature distribution, we noticed that many
snort messages suﬀered from a sparse representation. Indeed, although the snort rule
descriptions extend the length of original snort messages (see Section 3.1.1), most
of these messages are still quite short (below 15 words). To address this issue, we
investigated the use of entities in the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)
(see Section 2.1.1) to further supplement snort messages (see Section 4.2). The eﬀect
of this strategy is analyzed in Section 4.2.3.
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4.1 Feature Selection
In the baseline system (see Chapter 3), snort messages and CAPEC ﬁelds are repre-
sented by a mixture of unigrams, bigrams and trigrams. However, the contribution
of each type of n-gram was not clear. To measure the usefulness of each type of
n-gram, three experiments were performed: the use of unigrams only, bigrams only
and trigrams only. Sections 4.1.1, 4.1.2 and 4.1.3 describe these experiments; while
Section 4.1.4 provides an overall evaluation.
4.1.1 Experiments Based on Unigrams
Following the workﬂow of the baseline system (see Section 3.1.2), after removing
stop words and numbers, each snort message and CAPEC ﬁeld were stemmed and
tokenized. Unigrams were used as the only features to represent each snort alert
messages and CAPEC ﬁelds. The document frequency (DF) and term variance fre-
quency (TV) were then used to ﬁlter terms. Using various values for the parameters
in baseline system, we ran eight experiments (see Table 9). These experiments gave
rise to a feature set from size (|F |) of 111 to 15,963 unigrams. These features were
then represented by their TF.IDF values in the document-by-term matrix whose size
was (32,246 + 5096) ×|F |. Finally, the cosine measure was used to calculate the
distance between snort messages and CAPEC ﬁelds, choosing the nearest 3 ﬁelds as
mapping results.
Exp. SimT DF TV Expansion Nb of Features
Exp. #1 0 40 0.98 Yes 135
Exp. #2 0 0 0.98 Yes 135
Exp. #3 0 40 0 Yes 892
Exp. #4 0 0 0 Yes 15,963
Exp. #5 0 40 0.98 No 99
Exp. #6 0 0 0.98 No 99
Exp. #7 0 40 0 No 882
Exp. #8 0 0 0 No 13,709
Table 9: Description of the Unigram Experiments
Tables 10 and 18 in Appendix A show details of the results; while Figure 19 sum-
marises the results graphically. As Figure 19 shows, the metrics values in the snort
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Figure 19: Results of Unigram Experiment
rule extension scenario, where the RL was 40.80% with 905 features (DF = 40) fol-
lowed by the 29.12% with 140 features (TV = 0.98). Although the PL reached 99.94%
with 13,716 unigrams (without ﬁlters), its RL was only 23.83% which is the lowest
value among these three experiments. Similarly, 70.25% was the highest value of FL0.5
with 905 features whereas 60.98% was the smallest. In contrast, the best FL0.5 was
39.22% without snort rule name expansion (see Table 10), thus we will only focus on













Exp. #1 66.36% 44.85% 33.87% 0.11% 0.09% 0.07%
Exp. #2 66.36% 44.85% 33.87% 0.11% 0.09% 0.07%
Exp. #3 70.25% 55.28% 45.58% 23.44% 21.52% 19.89%
Exp. #4 60.98% 38.48% 28.11% 38.46% 28.10% 22.14%
Exp. #5 0.84% 0.34% 0.21% 0.59% 0.24% 0.15%
Exp. #6 0.84% 0.34% 0.21% 0.59% 0.24% 0.15%
Exp. #7 3.59% 1.48% 0.93% 5.09% 2.13% 1.35%
Exp. #8 39.22% 20.52% 13.90% 3.20% 1.87% 1.32%
Table 10: F-Measures of the Unigram Experiments
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4.1.2 Experiments Based on Bigrams and Trigrams
The next set of experiments focused on the use of bigrams and trigrams only. Using
the snort rule name descriptions, bigrams are used as the only features to represent
each snort message and CAPEC ﬁeld and the algorithm pipeline is identical as with
unigrams. Various parameters values were used as ﬁlters. Figure 20 shows that from
a total number of possible bigrams of 72,818, ﬁltering by document frequency (DF
= 40) reduce this number to 735, and to 77 through the TV (TV = 0.98) ﬁlter.
The signiﬁcant decrease implied that the distribution of bigrams were highly sparse.
Thus, although the mapping rate was 45.38% with 77 features (see Figure 21), the
precision, recall and F-measure values reached zero (see Figure 22). By contrast,
through document frequency ﬁltering, the number of features was ten times higher
than with term variance frequency (735 features) and the FL0.5 was kept at almost
70% (as shown in Figure 22). Without ﬁltering, although the number of bigrams was
72,818, many noisy features were removed which decreased FL0.5 to 23.90%.
Figure 20: Number of Bigram Features
Due to the signiﬁcant decrease in the number of bigrams, we can assume that
trigrams will suﬀer even more from this sparse distribution. As shown in Tables 22
and 23 (in Appendix A), although the total number of trigrams was 106,084, all values
of the mapping quality metrics were zero. This is because there are less common
trigrams between snort alert messages and attack ﬁelds in CAPEC.
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Figure 21: Mapping Rate of the Bigram Experiments
Figure 22: Results of the Bigram Experiments
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Based on the analysis of the use of unigrams, bigrams and trigrams respectively,
we continued conducting experiments on two kinds of n-grams mixtures: unigrams
+ bigrams and unigrams + bigrams + trigrams (which is equivalent to the baseline
Charibdis system), in the hopes of identifying a better n-grams mixture contributing
to the mapping quality.
4.1.3 Experiments Based on a Mixture of N-Grams
The purpose of this experiment is to identify if trigram can be beneﬁcial to the
mapping quality in a mixture of n-grams model. We ﬁrst used the mixture of unigrams
+ bigrams to represent each snort alert message and attack ﬁeld after tokenization,
stemming and the removal of stop words. The algorithm pipeline is identical to the
baseline Charibdis system. After we evaluated the unigrams + bigrams model, we
replaced it with unigrams + bigrams + trigrams mixture model and followed the same
pipeline to obtain the evaluation values. Table 11 shows the diﬀerence in the number
of features between the two n-grams mixtures and Figure 23 illustrates the mapping
quality of Experiment #3 and Experiment #7 (with DF = 40) in Tables 25 and
26. As the result shows, trigrams did not make diﬀerence in the baseline Charibdis
system. Therefore, in the next experiments, only unigrams, bigrams and the mixture
of unigrams + bigrams are used as features to represent documents.
Exp. SimT DF TV Expansion Nb of Features
Exp. #1 0 40 0.98 Yes 209
Exp. #2 0 0 0.98 Yes 209
Exp. #3 0 40 0 Yes 1,573
Exp. #4 0 0 0 Yes 89,313
Exp. #5 0 40 0.98 Yes 260
Exp. #6 0 0 0.98 Yes 260
Exp. #7 0 40 0 Yes 2,104
Exp. #8 0 0 0 Yes 193,227
Table 11: Description of the Mixture N-Grams Experiments
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Figure 23: Results of Two N-Grams Mixtures
4.1.4 Overall Conclusion on N-Gram Feature Selection
As in the previous analysis (see Section 4.1.3), we found that unigrams are the most
discriminating features contributing to the mapping quality, followed by bigrams;
whereas trigrams do not contribute anything. Thus, we analysed the length distribu-
tion in snort messages and attack ﬁelds. Figure 24 shows the length distribution of
snort messages and CAPEC ﬁelds for every 15 tokens. After the expansion of snort
rule name descriptions, 22,817 messages were expanded to less than 15 tokens which
accounts for 70% (22,817 / 32,246) of the total messages, while almost three quarters
of attack ﬁelds contain more than 15 tokens. Figure 25 illustrates the number of
correct and acceptable mappings with document frequency as 40 (DF = 40), snort
messages and attack ﬁelds are represented by the mixture of unigrams + bigrams.
Most of the mappings dropped in the [30, 45) tokens zone followed by the [15, 30) zone
whereas only 97 mappings generated from the ﬁrst zone. Thus, the short size of the
snort alert messages is a vital factor which hinders features to yield good mapping
result.
Overall, because of the small size of the snort alert messages, unigrams are the best
choice to represent snort messages and CAPEC ﬁelds. Thus, we considered that if the
snort alert messages can be supplemented, the number of overlapping bigrams could
be increased and the lenient recall (RL) and F-measure (FL0.5) could be improved. To
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Figure 24: Distribution of the Length of Snort Messages and CAPEC Fields
supplement snort messages and try to decrease noisy features, we therefore used the
related CVE entities speciﬁed at the end of each snort message (see Section 2.2.1.2)
to extend snort messages. This is discussed in next section.
4.2 Snort Messages Expansion
To address the issue of the short snort alert messages, we investigated to use Com-
mon Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) entities to supplement snort messages.
Section 4.2.1 describes the pipeline of this snort expansion and Section 4.2.2 gives the
analysis of the mapping results after the expansion.
4.2.1 Snort Messages Expansion Pipeline
As indicated in Section 2.2.1.2, the snort messages given to Charibdis include a ref-
erence to related CVE entity after the text of the snort message itself. For example,
the input
26312;”PROTOCOL-SCADA WellinTech Kingview HMI history server buﬀer over-
ﬂow attempt”;”cve,2011-4536”
indicates that the message is related to the CVE entity 2011-4536. Thus, the brief
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Figure 25: Number of Correct and Acceptable Mappings with the Mixture of Uni-
grams + Bigrams
description of the 2011-4536 CVE entity can be used to extend the snort message. As
described in Section 2.1.1, CVE includes 98,375 entities in total. To search a speciﬁc
entity from the large CVE dataset, we downloaded all of the CVE entities as an XML
ﬁle. Figure 26 shows the CVE-2011-4536 entity in the XML ﬁle. The text in bold
indicates the natural language description of the entity.
The descriptions in each CVE entity contains 30 tokens on average which have
been used to supplement snort messages through the pipeline indicated below:
1. The algorithm reads all of the CVE entities into memory, extracts CVE entity
IDs as keys and the natural language descriptions as values. The (key: value)
pairs are stored in a dictionary data structure in Python. The total size of the
dictionary is 98,375, which is the number of CVE entities. Although the size is
large, the time complexity of acquiring a CVE entity is O(1) because the data
structure is a hash. In our example in Figure 26, the (key: value) pair is
(2011-4536: Heap-based buffer overflow ... op-code 3 packet.)
2. After the creation of the dictionary, the program parses the CVE entity ID in
the input snort messages and use it as a key to get the associated descriptions
in the dictionary. Then, the obtained CVE entity descriptions are concatenated
at the end of the snort message to form a longer snort message. For instance,
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Figure 26: Example of a CVE Entity
the extended snort message in our running example is:
PROTOCOL-SCADA WellinTech Kingview HMI history server buffer
overflow attempt Heap-based buffer overflow in nettransdll.dll
in HistorySvr.exe (aka HistoryServer.exe) in WellinTech KingView
6.53 and 65.30.2010.18018 allows remote attackers to execute
arbitrary code via a crafted op-code 3 packet.op-code 3 packet.
The average size of the expanded snort messages increased from 15 to 50. To anal-
yse the increase in length of the snort messages after the CVE entity expansion, we
measured the length distribution of new snort messages. Figure 27 shows a compari-
son of the length of messages with and without CVE entity expansion. As Figure 27
shows, the number of snort messages containing less than 15 tokens decreased by half
after the CVE expansion, from 22,817 to 9,353, while a third of the snort messages
(12,189 / 32,246) now contain more than 45 tokens.
After these two supplement steps, the new snort messages are also extended through
snort rule name descriptions (see Section 3.1.1) and the algorithm of mapping sen-
tences is identical as baseline system. Based on the extended snort messages, we
again conducted unigrams, bigrams experiments respectively, as well as the mixture
of unigrams + bigrams.
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Figure 27: Comparison of the Length of Snort Messages with and without CVE
Expansion
4.2.2 Results and Analysis
Using the expanded snort messages, we re-run the three successful experiments of
Section 4.1: the use of unigrams only, the use of bigrams only and the mixture of
unigrams + bigrams.
4.2.2.1 Experiment Based on Unigrams
Following the same mapping algorithm indicated in Section 2.2.1.3, only unigrams
are used as features to represent extended snort alert messages and CAPEC attack
ﬁelds. With the document frequency ﬁlter as 40 (DF = 40), Figure 28 shows that the
values of RL, PL and FL0.5 all improved by 10% compared to the unigram performance
in the baseline Charibdis system.
4.2.2.2 Experiment Based on Bigrams
In addition to the unigrams, bigrams also beneﬁted from the use of CVE expansion.
Figure 29 illustrates that the RL increased from 31.30% in baseline system to 34.59%.
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Figure 28: Comparison of the Mapping Quality on Unigrams with and without CVE
Expansion
Figure 29: Comparison of the Mapping Quality on Bigrams with and without CVE
Expansion
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Figure 30: Comparison of the Mapping Quality of Mixture of Unigrams + Bigrams
with and without CVE Expansion
4.2.2.3 Experiment Based on the N-Gram Mixture
Finally, the mixture of unigrams + bigrams to represent messages and ﬁelds also
beneﬁted from the CVE expansion. Figure 30 shows an improvement of PL (13%)
and a 10% increase in FL0.5.
4.2.3 Analysis of the CVE Expansion
The CVE entity expansion increases the performance of the baseline Charibdis system
both in lenient precision and lenient recall using all feature combinations that we
experimented with. However, two thirds of the snort messages distributed at the
two sides in Figure 27, because only 47% (15,444 / 32,246) snort messages have the
related CVE entity descriptions. For example, the message
7063;”EXPLOIT-KIT Multiple exploit kit jar ﬁle retrieved on non-standard port”;
only has the snort ID and message content. Thus, the polarized length distribution
of the extended snort messages limited the improvement of mapping quality.
In this chapter, we analyzed the contribution of the unigrams, bigrams, trigrams
and two mixture feature models. Because of the small size of snort messages, unigrams
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seemed to contribute the most of the mapping quality. To address the short size issue,
we used CVE entity descriptions to supplement snort messages and the performance
of the system improved signiﬁcantly as the FL0.5 increased from 70.49% to 80.72% with
the mixture of unigrams and bigrams. However, the polarized length distribution of
the extended snort messages seemed to prevent the increase of the mapping quality
(see Figure 27) even further because only 47% of the snort messages have a related
CVE entity. In order to supplement all of the messages, we investigated to use
similar messages pre-clustering techniques before mapping. In the next chapter, we




In this chapter, we describe our second approach to improve the system performance:
pre-clustering snort alert messages. After analyzing snort messages and discussed
with our two security analysts, we noticed that many snort messages share similar
content, hence it would seem natural that they be mapped to similar CAPEC ﬁelds.
For example, these three example snort messages:
FILE-PDF Adobe Acrobat Reader embedded TTF bytecode memory corruption attempt
FILE-PDF Adobe Acrobat Reader TTF parsing bad cmap format attempt
FILE-PDF Adobe Reader embedded TTF interger overﬂow attempt
describe vulnerability exploits about Adobe reader TTF and should be mapped to
similar CAPEC ﬁelds. To ensure this, we experiment with clustering the snort mes-
sages prior to mapping them. Each snort message within a cluster is then mapped
to the same CAPEC ﬁeld. Section 5.1 describes the K-Means clustering algorithm
that we used and the pre-clustering pipeline used in the enhanced system. Section 5.2
analyses the mapping quality after clustering similar snort alert messages.
5.1 K-Means Clustering
In this section, we ﬁrst describe the basics of K-Means clustering in Section 5.1.1,
followed by a description of the pipeline using K-Means in the enhanced system in
Section 5.1.2.
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5.1.1 Introduction to K-Means
K-Means [Jain and Dubes, 1988] is a widely used unsupervised clustering algorithm.
The goal of this algorithm is to group data into k clusters based on the similarity
of the data and reﬁne the clusters iteratively until producing the ﬁnal results. The
algorithm consists of four main steps:
1. The algorithm inputs are a collection of data and the number of described
clusters k.
2. K cluster centroids are generated randomly from the dataset and each centroid
represents a unique cluster.
3. Each data is assigned to its nearest centroid measured by the standard (L2)
Euclidean distance (see Section 2.3.1.2). Data which share the same centroid






where dist() is the the standard (L2) Euclidean distance, C is the collection of
centroids, ci is a centroid in the collection and x represents one data from the
dataset.
4. The data in the same cluster are used to update the centroid of their cluster.
Suppose that the data in the ith cluster is the set Si, then the update process







The algorithm repeats step 3 and 4 until meeting a stopping criteria, such as
the limit on the iteration steps or the minimum distance threshold between data
and centroid. In our system, we use the K-Means algorithm as implemented in the
scikit-learn library and the stopping criteria was set to a maximum of 300 iterations.
5.1.2 Algorithm Pipeline
To try to increase the mapping quality and address the issue of the small size of
snort messages, we attempted to pre-cluster snort message before mapping them.
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Speciﬁcally, snort messages are ﬁrst expanded by the snort rule name description (see
Section 3.1.1), and the expanded snort alert messages were represented by unigrams
after the removal of the punctuation and stop words. These unigrams are used in the
document-by-matrix representation and each entry is the TF.IDF value. Messages
which share similar content are clustered in the same cluster via the K-Means algo-
rithm. Snort messages in the same cluster are then concatenated into a single long
message, and the resulting longer messages is then mapped to CAPEC ﬁelds using
the same mapping algorithm as the baseline system (see Section 2.2.1.3).
We experimented with various numbers of clusters (n) which as a side-eﬀect also
varied the length of the resulting message to map. The trade-oﬀ is that a larger
number of clusters (n) should lead to a greater number of possible CAPEC ﬁelds
being mapped to each snort messages, but should also lead to a shorter message and
sparser representation. Figure 31 shows the average length of the new longer snort
messages when using various number numbers of clusters. As shown in Figure 31,
the length of snort messages varies from 23,539 (with 20 clusters) to 94 (with 5,000
clusters) and the length of the message is 235 (with 2,000 clusters) which is almost
equivalent to the length of CAPEC ﬁelds (see Section 2.1.3). Based on these n
clusters, we conducted the experiments and analyse the mapping quality in the next
section.
Figure 31: Distribution of Average Snort Length with Diﬀerent Numbers of Clusters
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5.2 Analysis of Pre-clustering
After clustering snort messages into n clusters using the K-Means algorithm (see
Section 5.1) and concatenating longer messages, we used document frequency (DF)
only and term variance frequency (TV) only as the ﬁlters similarly to the three
experiments of Section 4.1: using unigrams only, using bigrams only and using the
mixture of unigrams + bigrams to represent snort messages and CAPEC attack ﬁelds.
5.2.1 Experiments Based on Unigrams
Tables 12 and 13 show the number of features with document frequency (DF = 40)
only and term variance frequency only (TV = 0.98) of each cluster based on the
unigrams. These experiments gave raise to a feature set F where size ranges from
485 to 650 with the DF ﬁlter and from 650 to 1,218 with TV ﬁlter. Both the system
with DF ﬁlter and that with TV ﬁlter perform best in the condition of 20 clusters
(see Tables 38 and 39 in the Appendix). Figure 32 shows that the best FL0.5 achieved
80.50% when using the term variance frequency ﬁlter whereas this ﬁgure reached
71.68% with document frequency. Compared to the DF system, TV system performs
better. In addition, Figure 33 shows the values of PL, RL and FL0.5 all increased by 10%
through the use of the pre-clustering technique with term variance ﬁlter compared to
the baseline system.
Exp. SimT n DF TV Expansion Nb of Features
Exp. #1 0 20 40 0 Yes 485
Exp. #2 0 50 40 0 Yes 501
Exp. #3 0 100 40 0 Yes 522
Exp. #4 0 500 40 0 Yes 581
Exp. #5 0 1,000 40 0 Yes 591
Exp. #6 0 2,000 40 0 Yes 617
Exp. #7 0 3,000 40 0 Yes 631
Exp. #8 0 4,000 40 0 Yes 635
Exp. #9 0 5,000 40 0 Yes 650
Table 12: Description of the Pre-clustering on Unigrams Experiments only with Doc-
ument Frequency
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Exp. SimT n DF TV Expansion Nb of Features
Exp. #1 0 20 0 0.98 Yes 1,218
Exp. #2 0 50 0 0.98 Yes 1,125
Exp. #3 0 100 0 0.98 Yes 1,078
Exp. #4 0 500 0 0.98 Yes 1,015
Exp. #5 0 1,000 0 0.98 Yes 1,019
Exp. #6 0 2,000 0 0.98 Yes 951
Exp. #7 0 3,000 0 0.98 Yes 631
Exp. #8 0 4,000 0 0.98 Yes 635
Exp. #9 0 5,000 0 0.98 Yes 650
Table 13: Description of the Pre-clustering on Unigrams Experiments only with Term
Variance Frequency
Figure 32: Comparison of Mapping Quality in Unigrams with DF only and TV only
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Figure 33: Comparison of Mapping Quality in Unigrams with 20 Clusters + TV and
Baseline
5.2.2 Experiments Based on Bigrams
In addition to the unigram experiments, we used bigrams only to represent snort
messages and attack ﬁelds. Using the document frequency as ﬁlter, the FL0.5 reached
73.79% with 3,000 clusters whereas the system with term variance frequency only
achieved 60.27% in the same number of clusters (see Tables 42 and 45 in the Ap-
pendix). Compared to the bigram performance in the baseline system, Figure 34
illustrates that the pre-clustering technique improved the RL from 31.30% to 36.40%
without hurting the PL (99.96%) and the FL0.5 also increased to 73.79%.
5.2.3 Experiments Based on Mixture of Unigrams + Bigrams
Finally, the mixture of unigrams + bigrams are used as features after clustering
similar snort messages. The RL reached 49.57% using the document frequency ﬁlter
with 20 clusters and the PL reached 87.42% which increased the mapping quality
in baseline. Similarly, using term variance frequency as ﬁlter, the values of RL and
PL achieved 48.79% and 97.11% respectively with 1,000 clusters and improved the
F 0.5L to 80.99% which is the highest value so far. When comparing these two kinds
of ﬁltering methods, the term variance frequency (TV = 0.98) seems to perform the
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Figure 34: Comparison of Mapping Quality in Bigrams with 2000 Clusters + DF and
Baseline
best in terms of both recall and precision. Figure 35 shows the comparison of the
mapping quality with 1,000 clusters and the TV ﬁltering and baseline in terms of all
the values of lenient recall, precision and F-measure increased by almost 10%.
Figure 35: Comparison of Mapping Quality in Mixture of Unigrams + Bigrams with
1000 Clusters + TV and Baseline
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5.2.4 Analysis of the Messages Pre-clustering
Based on the content similarity of snort messages, the pre-clustering method enhanced
the mapping quality signiﬁcantly compared to the baseline. Table 14 shows the results
of the system with and without clustering as part of the pre-processing for various
values of n when using unigrams + bigrams as features. As shown in Table 14, the
best conﬁgurations in terms of F-measure are when using clustering with values of n
between 500 and 3000 and using term variance frequency as ﬁlter. With these values,
the results are not statistically diﬀerent, with FL0.5 ≈ 80% and FL1 ≈ 65%. Recall
itself has reached ≈ 48% from a low 35.22% in the baseline (see Section 3.2.2). The
best performance was achieved when n = 1000 and the FL1 was 64.84%. In addition,
Table 14 shows the trade-oﬀ between the use of a smaller number of clusters (smaller
n) which leads to a smaller number of possible output CAPEC ﬁelds and the use
of a larger n which leads to a sparser snort representation. Hence leading to lower
F-measures with n ≥ 3000 and n ≤ 100.
System n PL RL FL0.5 F
L
1 Snort Length
Baseline n/a 97.96% 35.22% 72.23% 51.82% 15
Clustering 5000 86.62% 48.21% 74.71% 61.94% 94
Clustering 4000 86.41% 47.71% 74.35% 61.47% 117
Clustering 3000 97.11% 48.64% 80.97% 64.81% 157
Clustering 2000 96.82% 48.34% 80.65% 64.49% 235
Clustering 1000 97.11% 48.67% 80.99% 64.84% 470
Clustering 500 96.94% 48.51% 80.81% 64.67% 941
Clustering 100 96.00% 36.48% 72.38% 52.87% 4,707
Clustering 50 96.10% 36.58% 72.51% 52.99% 9,415
Clustering 20 96.13% 36.45% 72.42% 52.86% 23,539
Table 14: Results with the Mixture of Unigrams + Bigrams with Diﬀerent Cluster
Numbers + TV Filter
Compared to the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) expansion (see
Section 4.2), the pre-clustering technique in the pre-processing step also performs
better. Figure 36 shows how the pre-clustering contributes to the performance in
comparison of CVE expansion (see Section 4.2) and the baseline alone, in terms of
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lenient recall (RL) and F-measure (FL1 ). As shown in Figure 36, the R
L increased
to 48.79% from 46.79% with the CVE expansion and the FL1 improved to 64.84%.
Both pre-clustering and CVE expansion improved the mapping quality signiﬁcantly
compared to the baseline.
Figure 36: Analysis of the Mapping Quality Between the Baseline, the CVE Expan-
sion and the Pre-clustering
In this chapter, we introduced the K-Means clustering algorithm and the pre-
clustering algorithm pipeline used to enhance the mapping quality of the baseline
system. We experimented with unigrams only, bigrams only and the mixture of un-
igrams + bigrams as features and analyzed the contribution of the pre-clustering
technique. The mixture of unigrams + bigrams contributed most to the mapping
quality. Using document frequency as the only ﬁlter and 20 clusters, the n-grams
mixture achieved the highest lenient recall (RL) at 49.57%. Likewise, using the vari-
ance term frequency ﬁlter only, the mixture increased all the values of RL, PL and
FL1 by 10%. However, when using a larger number of clusters (n ≥ 3000), the sparse
distribution of the snort messages seems to prevent an increase in the mapping qual-
ity. In order to tackle the sparse distribution problem, we investigated to use Latent
Semantic Analysis (LSA) to decrease the dimension of feature set before mapping. In
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In this chapter, we describe the third approach to improve the mapping quality of
the baseline system: Semantic Mapping by Latent Semantic Analysis. Recall from
Section 2.3.4.1, that Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA) is widely used to reduce the
feature size through removing unimportant latent topics. Section 6.1 introduces the
basic idea of LSA and the algorithm pipeline in our system. Then, Section 6.2 analyses
the enhanced mapping quality.
6.1 Latent Semantic Analysis
Mathematically, LSA decreases the dimension of the feature space to n topics us-
ing singular value decomposition (SVD) which is a well known matrix decomposition
method. Any rectangular matrix can be decomposed into the product of three ma-
trices:
C = UΣV T
where C is the rectangular matrix, U and V T are two orthogonal matrices and Σ is
a square diagonal matrix. Each diagonal value in Σ represents the importance of a
unique topic and those smaller values which describe unimportant topics are removed
in order to reduce the dimension of the features. The remained n topics highlight
the documents similarity. In the enhanced system, the document-by-term matrix
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which is converted by the snort messages and CAPEC ﬁelds (see Section 2.2.1.3), is
truncated into n important topics (dimensions) using the TruncatedSVD method in
the scikit-learn library. For instance, suppose we have two snort messages and two
CAPEC ﬁelds as follow.
Snort Messages:
d1: BROWSER-FIREFOX Mozilla Firefox IDB use-after-free attempt
d2: SQL 1 = 1 - possible sql injection attempt
CAPEC Attack Fields:
d3: This category is related to the WASC Threat Classification
2.0 item SQL Injection
d4: Use a browser to manually explore the website and analyze
how it is constructed. Many browser’s plug-in are available to
facilitate the analysis or automate the URL discover
When using unigrams only as features, the converted document-by-term matrix
is:
attempt browser inject sql url ... websit
d1 1 1 0 0 0 ... 0
d2 1 0 1 2 0 ... 0
d3 0 0 1 1 0 ... 0
d4 0 2 0 0 1 ... 1
where each entry in this matrix is the term frequency in each document. In total,
there are 28 unique unigram features in these four documents and this feature matrix
suﬀers from a sparse distribution. After the feature dimension reduced is from 28 to 4
by using the latent semantic analysis method (TruncatedSVD method in scikit-learn
library), the document-by-topics matrix becomes:
topic1 topic2 topic3 topic4
d1 0.97 0.89 2.66 -0.36
d2 0.10 2.11 -0.15 1.58
d3 0.03 2.32 -0.96 -1.29
d4 4.06 -0.28 -0.62 0.06
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where each entry in the document-by-topics matrix is the sum of the contribution
of each feature in the corresponding document to the topic. For example, 0.97
represents the sum of the contribution of all the features in document 1 (d1) to topic
1 (topic1). The negative values indicate that the document is strongly unrelated to
the topic.
6.1.1 Algorithm Pipeline
In the enhanced system, after the tokenizaion, the removal of stop words and stem-
ming, term frequency only and TF.IDF (see Section 2.2.1.3) only are used as term
weights separately in the document-by-term matrix. Without the ﬁltering of docu-
ment frequency (DF) and term variance frequency (TV), the latent semantic analysis
method truncates snort messages and attack ﬁelds to n latent topics, where n varies
from 5,000 to 100. Then, the cosine measure calculates the similarity between snort
messages and attack ﬁelds represented in the document-by-topics matrix, and the 3
most similar ﬁelds are chosen as mapping result. The trade-oﬀ is that when using a
larger number of topics, the details in snort messages and attack ﬁelds are taken into
account in the similarity mapping whereas a smaller number of topics removes details
and results only the summarization of messages and ﬁelds.
6.2 Analysis of the Latent Semantic Analysis Ap-
proach
With term frequency only and TF.IDF only, we conducted the three experiments
similarly to Section 4.1: using unigrams only, using bigrams only and using the
mixture of unigrams + bigrams to represent snort messages and CAPEC attack ﬁelds.
6.2.1 Experiments Based on Unigrams
Table 15 shows that the total number of unigrams features is 15,963 without the
document frequency and term variance ﬁltering. With 2,000 topics (Exp. #4), the
RL achieved 47.82% and FL1 reached 64.34% with term frequency as term weight
whereas the value of RL was only 24.33% and the FL1 achieved almost 39.15% with
TF.IDF weight (see Tables 53 and 55 in the Appendix). Figure 37 compares the best
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performance of the baseline system and LSA methods with unigrams only. The RL
improved from 41.15% to 47.28% and the FL1 increased by almost 10%, which is similar
to the enhancement of the CVE expansion and pre-clustering (see Sections 4.1.1 and
5.2.1).
Exp. SimT n DF TV Expansion Nb of Features
Exp. #1 0 100 0 0 Yes 15,963
Exp. #2 0 500 0 0 Yes 15,963
Exp. #3 0 1,000 0 0 Yes 15,963
Exp. #4 0 2,000 0 0 Yes 15,963
Exp. #5 0 3,000 0 0 Yes 15,963
Exp. #6 0 4,000 0 0 Yes 15,963
Exp. #7 0 5,000 0 0 Yes 15,963
Table 15: Description of the Unigram with Latent Semantic Analysis Experiments
Figure 37: Comparison of the Mapping Quality of Unigrams Only Between Baseline
and LSA
6.2.2 Experiments Based on Bigrams
With a smaller number of topics and bigrams only, the performance of the two weights
(term frequency and TF.IDF) is almost equal, with RL ≈ 35% and FL1 ≈ 52% (see
Tables 57 and 59 in the Appendix). Compared to the baseline system, the LSA
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method increased the mapping quality by 5%. Figure 38 shows that the RL and the
FL1 improved to 35.69% and 52.06% respectively without hurting the value of lenient
precision.
Figure 38: Comparison of the Mapping Quality of Bigrams Only Between Baseline
and LSA
6.2.3 Experiments Based on Mixture of Unigrams + Bigrams
Similarly to the previous experiment, the mixture of unigrams + bigrams were used
as features to represent snort messages and attack ﬁelds. Table 16 shows that the
total number of unigrams + bigrams is 89,313 without document frequency and term
variance frequency ﬁltering. When reducing these almost 90,000 features to 5,000
and using term frequency as term weights, the RL achieved 48% and the FL1 reached
64.50%. Figure 39 shows the improvement that the latent semantic analysis method
contributed. Compared to the baseline system, the LSA method not only increased
the PL to 98.30%, but the RL also improved by 7% and the FL1 achieved 64.50%.
6.2.4 Analysis of the Latent Semantic Analysis
Through removing unimportant topics, the latent semantic analysis method enhanced
the performance of the baseline system. Table 17 shows the best mapping quality on
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Exp. SimT n DF TV Expansion Nb of Features
Exp. #1 0 100 0 0 Yes 89,313
Exp. #2 0 500 0 0 Yes 89,313
Exp. #3 0 1,000 0 0 Yes 89,313
Exp. #4 0 2,000 0 0 Yes 89,313
Exp. #5 0 3,000 0 0 Yes 89,313
Exp. #6 0 4,000 0 0 Yes 89,313
Exp. #7 0 5,000 0 0 Yes 89,313
Table 16: Description of the Mixture of Unigrams + Bigrams on Latent Semantic
Analysis Experiments
Figure 39: Comparison of the Mapping Quality of Mixture of Unigrams + Bigrams
Between Baseline and LSA
the unigrams only, bigrams only and the mixture of unigrams + bigrams with the
corresponding term weight and the number of topics. Compared to using TF.IDF
as term weight, the term frequency is able to achieve a better mapping quality. As
shown in Table 17, the best conﬁgurations in terms of F-measure are when using 5,000
as the number of topics, term frequency as term weight and the mixture of unigrams
+ bigrams as feature.
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Feature Weight Nb of Features n PL RL FL1
Unigrams TF 15,963 2,000 98.29% 47.82% 64.34%
Unigrams TF.IDF 15,963 4,000 99.97% 24.35% 39.17%
Bigrams TF 73,350 500 100.00% 35.69% 52.60%
Bigrams TF.IDF 73,350 100 100.00% 34.82% 51.65%
Mixture TF 89,313 5,000 98.30% 48.00% 64.50%
Mixture TF.IDF 89,313 3,000 100.00% 35.31% 52.19%
Table 17: Comparison of the Mapping Quality Between Term Frequency and TF.IDF
In this chapter, we have described the use of latent semantic analysis and the
pipeline used to improve the mapping quality of the baseline system. Three experi-
ments were conducted: unigrams only, bigrams only and the mixture of unigrams +
bigrams with term frequency and TF.IDF respectively and the contribution of the
LSA was analysed. With term frequency and the use of 5,000 topics, the mixture of
unigrams + bigrams performs best with an FL1 of 64.50%. In the next chapter, we
will compare all of these three approaches and draw an overall conclusion.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
7.1 Conclusion
This thesis described several evaluation metrics and three approaches to enhance an
existing Intrusion Detection System (IDS) for the automatic mapping of snort alert
messages to known attack patterns. After evaluating the baseline system against a
gold-standard, we found that unigrams are the most discriminating features contribut-
ing to the mapping quality, followed by bigrams; whereas trigrams do not contribute
anything.
To address the short size issue highlighted in Section 1.1, we used Common Vul-
nerabilities and Exposures (CVE) entity descriptions to supplement snort messages
and the performance of the system improved signiﬁcantly as the FL1 increased from
51.81% to 63.46% with the mixture of unigrams + bigrams. Compared to the CVE
expansion, the pre-clustering technique proposed in Chapter 5, in the pre-processing
step performs better. The n-gram mixture achieved the highest lenient recall (RL) at
49.57% and the FL1 increased to 48.67%. Also, the latent semantic analysis method
of Chapter 6 enhanced the baseline system through reducing the feature size and the
FL1 improved to 48.00%
Finally, the recommended conﬁgurations are using the mixture of unigrams +
bigrams as feature, clustering snort messages into 1,000 clusters and using term vari-
ance frequency as ﬁlter. With this conﬁguration, the enhanced system performs best
with the value of RL = 48.67% and FL1 = 64.84%.
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7.2 Future Work
As future work, it would be interesting to investigate the use of various automatic
snort expansion methods. Currently, the snort rule name relies on hand-written
term expansions and the detail snort messages are extended only through Common
Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) [MITRE, 2017b]. Because of the high work-
load restriction, hand written expansions cannot support snort rule name expan-
sion when the number of snort messages is large. Also, the entities in CVE do not
cover all snort messages, hence it cannot be used to supplement all snort messages.
Thus, by using existing knowledge bases such as the Common Weakness Enumera-
tion [MITRE, 2017c] or the Computer Security category in Wikipedia rather than
relying on hand-written term expansion and Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
is necessary.
In addition, it would be interesting to look beyond the mapping of individual snort
messages, and try to identify and match entire patterns/groups of snort messages as
an indication of possible cyber attacks. In CAPEC, many attack patterns contain
attack ﬁelds which have similar contents whereas these attack patterns are not similar.
Thus, it could be an interesting research avenue to consider attack patterns as the
smallest unit to map to snort messages.
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Appendix A
Details of Experimented Results
Unigrams on Baseline
Table 18 shows the lenient and strict measures when using unigrams only as the
feature to represent snort alert messages and CAPEC attack ﬁelds.
Exp. MR MQ Lenient Strict
Correct Acceptable Incorrect PL RL PS RS
Exp. #1 98.95% 6 4,280 108 97.54% 29.12% 0.14% 0.07%
Exp. #2 98.95% 6 4,280 108 97.54% 29.12% 0.14% 0.07%
Exp. #3 99.40% 1.746 4,259 1,001 85.71% 40.80% 24.92% 18.93%
Exp. #4 99.42% 1,789 1,718 2 99.94% 23.83% 50.98% 19.40%
Exp. #5 98.18% 11 14 10 71.43% 0.17% 31.43% 0.12%
Exp. #6 98.18% 11 14 10 71.43% 0.17% 31.43% 0.12%
Exp. #7 99.40% 100 10 38 74.32% 0.75% 67.57% 1.08%
Exp. #8 99.42% 102 1,581 1 99.94% 11.43% 6.06% 1.11%
Table 18: Results of the Unigram Experiments
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Bigrams on Baseline
Table 19 shows the number of bigrams representing the snort messages and attack
ﬁelds when using diﬀerent combinations of document frequency (DF) and term vari-
ance ﬁlter (TV). Tables 20 and 21 show the mapping quality of bigrams.
Exp. SimT DF TV Expansion Nb of Features
Exp. #1 0 40 0.98 Yes 74
Exp. #2 0 0 0.98 Yes 74
Exp. #3 0 40 0 Yes 681
Exp. #4 0 0 0 Yes 73,350
Table 19: Description of the Bigram Experiments
Exp. MR MQ Lenient Strict
Correct Acceptable Incorrect PL RL PS RS
Exp. #1 45.38% 0 0 2 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Exp. #2 45.38% 0 0 2 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Exp. #3 63.35% 1,539 3,068 2 99.96% 31.30% 33.39% 16.69%
Exp. #4 66.16% 1,783 1,734 5 99.86% 23.90% 50.62% 19.33%













Exp. #1 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Exp. #2 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Exp. #3 69.48% 47.67% 36.29% 27.82% 22.25% 47.67%
Exp. #4 61.05% 27.98% 28.18% 38.25% 27.98% 22.06%
Table 21: F-Measures of the Bigram Experiments
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Trigrams on Baseline
Tables 22, 23 and 24 demonstrate the number of trigrams and the related mapping
quality.
Exp. SimT DF TV Expansion Nb of Features
Exp. #1 0 40 0.98 Yes 51
Exp. #2 0 0 0.98 Yes 51
Exp. #3 0 40 0 Yes 531
Exp. #4 0 0 0 Yes 103,914
Table 22: Description of the Trigram Experiments
Exp. MR MQ Lenient Strict
Correct Acceptable Incorrect PL RL PS RS
Exp. #1 0% 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Exp. #2 0% 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Exp. #3 4.71% 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Exp. #4 5.33% 0 0 1 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%













Exp. #1 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Exp. #2 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Exp. #3 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Exp. #4 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Table 24: F-Measures of the Trigram Experiments
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Mixture of N-Grams on Baseline
After measuring each n-gram, Tables 25 and 26 show the mapping results and F-
measure values when using the mixture of unigrams and bigrams and trigrams.
Exp. MR MQ Lenient Strict
Correct Acceptable Incorrect PL RL PS RS
Exp. #1 98.95% 6 5,178 107 97.97% 35.22% 0.11% 0.06%
Exp. #2 98.95% 6 5,178 107 97.97% 35.22% 0.11% 0.06%
Exp. #3 99.40% 1,781 4,276 1,002 85.80% 41.15% 25.22% 19.31%
Exp. #4 99.42% 1,781 2,519 0 100.00% 29.22% 41.42% 19.31%
Exp. #5 98.95% 6 5,178 108 97.96% 35.22% 0.11% 0.07%
Exp. #6 98.95% 6 5,178 108 97.96% 35.22% 0.11% 0.07%
Exp. #7 99.40% 1,781 4,276 1,004 85.78% 41.15% 25.22% 19.31%
Exp. #8 99.43% 1,744 2,516 2 99.95% 28.94% 40.92% 18.91%













Exp. #1 72.23% 51.81% 40.40% 0.10% 0.08% 0.07%
Exp. #2 72.23% 51.81% 40.40% 0.10% 0.08% 0.07%
Exp. #3 70.49% 55.62% 45.93% 23.77% 21.88% 20.26%
Exp. #4 67.36% 45.22% 34.03% 33.70% 26.34% 21.62%
Exp. #5 72.23% 51.81% 40.40% 0.10% 0.08% 0.07%
Exp. #6 72.23% 51.81% 40.40% 0.10% 0.08% 0.07%
Exp. #7 70.49% 55.62% 45.93% 23.77% 21.88% 20.26%
Exp #8 67.36% 45.22% 34.03% 33.70% 26.34% 21.62%
Table 26: F-Measures of the Mixture N-Grams Experiments
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Unigrams on Common Vulnerabilities and Expo-
sures Extension
Tables 27 and 28 show the number of unigrams and the mapping results, in terms of
lenient and strict values. Table 29 indicates the F-measure after the CVE extension.
Exp. SimT DF TV Expansion Nb of Features
Exp. #1 0 40 0.98 Yes 337
Exp. #2 0 0 0.98 Yes 341
Exp. #3 0 40 0 Yes 1,383
Exp. #4 0 0 0 Yes 22,221
Table 27: Description of the Unigrams on CVE Extension Experiments
Exp. MR MQ Lenient Strict
Correct Acceptable Incorrect PL RL PS RS
Exp. #1 99.16% 1,624 4,312 176 97.12% 40.33% 26.57% 17.61%
Exp. #2 99.16% 1,624 4,312 176 97.12% 40.33% 26.57% 17.61%
Exp. #3 99.45% 1,735 5,149 139 98.02% 46.77% 24.70% 18.81%
Exp. #4 99.47% 1,743 1,738 1 99.97% 23.65% 50.05% 18.90%













Exp. #1 75.78% 56.99% 45.67% 24.11% 21.18% 18.88%
Exp. #2 75.78% 56.99% 45.67% 24.11% 21.18% 18.88%
Exp. #3 80.40% 63.32% 52.23% 23.24% 21.36% 19.75%
Exp. #4 60.75% 38.25% 27.91% 37.64% 27.44% 21.58%
Table 29: F-Measures of the Unigrams on CVE Extension Experiments
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Bigrams on Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
Extension
Tables 30, 31 and 32 show the mapping quality and F-measure when using bigrams
to represent CAPEC attack ﬁelds and extended snort messages.
Exp. SimT DF TV Expansion Nb of Features
Exp. #1 0 40 0.98 Yes 217
Exp. #2 0 0 0.98 Yes 222
Exp. #3 0 40 0 Yes 2,312
Exp. #4 0 0 0 Yes 113,180
Table 30: Description of the Bigrams on CVE Extension Experiments
Exp. MR MQ Lenient Strict
Correct Acceptable Incorrect PL RL PS RS
Exp. #1 76.94% 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Exp. #2 76.94% 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Exp. #3 83.88% 1,708 3,384 3 99.94% 34.59% 33.52% 18.52%
Exp. #4 85.31% 1,712 1,693 4 99.88% 23.13% 50.22% 18.56%













Exp. #1 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Exp. #2 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Exp. #3 72.53% 51.40% 39.80% 28.84% 23.85% 20.34%
Exp. #4 60.04% 37.56% 27.33% 37.44% 27.10% 21.24%
Table 32: F-Measures of the Bigrams on CVE Extension Experiments
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Mixture of Unigrams + Bigrams on Common Vul-
nerabilities and Exposures Expansion
Compared with using unigrams only and bigrams only, the mixture of unigrams and
bigrams performs best.
Exp. SimT DF TV Expansion Nb of Features
Exp. #1 0 40 0.98 Yes 554
Exp. #2 0 0 0.98 Yes 563
Exp. #3 0 40 0 Yes 3,695
Exp. #4 0 0 0 Yes 135,401
Table 33: Description of the Mixture of Unigrams + Bigrams on CVE Extension
Experiments
Exp. MR MQ Lenient Strict
Correct Acceptable Incorrect PL RL PS RS
Exp. #1 99.16% 1,693 5,145 174 97.51% 46.46% 24.14% 18.35%
Exp. #2 99.16% 1,693 5,145 174 97.51% 46.46% 24.14% 18.35%
Exp. #3 99.45% 1,743 5,144 98 98.59% 46.79% 24.95% 18.90%
Exp. #4 99.47% 1,732 2,524 1 99.97% 28.91% 40.68% 18.78%














Exp. #1 79.94% 62.93% 51.89% 22.71% 20.85% 19.28%
Exp. #2 79.94% 62.93% 51.89% 22.71% 20.85% 19.28%
Exp. #3 80.72% 63.46% 52.28% 23.45% 21.50% 19.86%
Exp. #4 67.03% 44.85% 33.70% 32.99% 25.69% 21.04%
Table 35: F-Measures of the Mixture of Unigrams + Bigrams on CVE Extension
Experiments
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Unigrams on Pre-clustering Experiments
Using document frequency (DF) and term variance frequency (TV) separately and
unigrams as features, Tables 36, 37, 38 and 39 show the mapping quality values and
F-measures when clustering similar snort messages into one cluster.
Exp. MR MQ Lenient Strict
Correct Acceptable Incorrect PL RL PS RS
Exp. #1 100.00% 1,860 4,498 1,049 85.83% 43.19% 25.11% 20.16%
Exp. #2 100.00% 1,859 4,424 1,249 83.41% 42.68% 24.68% 20.15%
Exp. #3 100.00% 1,858 4,357 1,054 85.50% 42.22% 25.56% 20.14%
Exp. #4 100.00% 1,841 4,386 1,003 86.12% 42.30% 25.46% 19.96%
Exp. #5 100.00% 1,832 4,376 1,009 86.01% 42.17% 25.38% 19.86%
Exp. #6 100.00% 1,829 4,381 1,007 86.04% 42.19% 25.34% 19.83%
Exp. #7 100.00% 1,831 4,378 1,003 86.09% 42.18% 25.38% 19.85%
Exp. #8 100.00% 1,819 4,334 997 86.05% 41.80% 25.44% 19.72%
Exp. #9 100.00% 1,809 4,338 995 86.06% 41.76% 25.32% 19.61%














Exp. #1 71.68% 57.47% 47.96% 23.93% 22.37% 20.99%
Exp. #2 70.05% 56.47% 47.30% 23.62% 22.19% 20.92%
Exp. #3 70.95% 56.53% 46.98% 24.25% 22.53% 21.03%
Exp. #4 71.34% 56.74% 47.10% 24.13% 22.38% 20.86%
Exp. #5 71.21% 56.60% 46.96% 24.04% 22.28% 20.76%
Exp. #6 71.23% 56.62% 46.98% 24.00% 22.25% 20.73%
Exp. #7 71.25% 56.62% 46.97% 24.04% 22.28% 20.75%
Exp. #8 71.02% 56.27% 46.59% 24.04% 22.22% 20.65%
Exp. #9 71.00% 56.23% 46.55% 23.93% 22.10% 20.54%
Table 37: F-Measures of the Unigrams on Pre-clustering Experiments with Document
Frequency
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Exp. MR MQ Lenient Strict
Correct Acceptable Incorrect PL RL PS RS
Exp. #1 100.00% 1,859 5,385 324 95.71% 49.21% 24.56% 20.15%
Exp. #2 100.00% 1,849 5,363 327 95.66% 49.00% 24.52% 20.05%
Exp. #3 100.00% 1,845 5,296 337 95.49% 48.51% 24.67% 20.01%
Exp. #4 100.00% 1,841 5,281 317 95.74% 48.39% 24.75% 19.96%
Exp. #5 100.00% 1,827 5,281 317 95.73% 48.29% 24.61% 19.81%
Exp. #6 100.00% 96 5,268 337 94.08% 36.44% 1.68% 1.04%
Exp. #7 100.00% 94 5,269 308 94.56% 36.43% 1.65% 1.02%
Exp. #8 99.78% 49 4,339 1,198 78.55% 29.81% 0.87% 0.53%
Exp. #9 99.56% 50 4,329 1,190 78.63% 29.75% 0.89% 0.54%














Exp. #1 80.50% 65.00% 54.51% 23.53% 22.14% 20.90%
Exp. #2 80.35% 64.80% 54.30% 23.47% 22.06% 20.80%
Exp. #3 80.00% 64.34% 53.81% 23.57% 22.09% 20.79%
Exp. #4 80.06% 64.28% 53.70% 23.61% 22.09% 20.76%
Exp. #5 80.01% 64.20% 53.60% 23.47% 21.94% 20.61%
Exp. #6 71.47% 52.53% 41.53% 1.49% 1.28% 1.12%
Exp. #7 71.69% 52.60% 41.54% 1.47% 1.26% 1.10%
Exp. #8 59.19% 43.22% 34.03% 0.77% 0.66% 0.57%
Exp. #9 59.18% 43.17% 33.97% 0.79% 0.67% 0.58%
Table 39: F-Measures of the Unigrams on Pre-clustering Experiments with Term
Variance Frequency
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Bigrams on Pre-clustering Experiments
Tables 40, 41, 42, 43, 44 and 45 show the results in using bigrams only as feature to
represent snort messages and attack ﬁelds.
Exp. SimT n DF TV Expansion Nb of Features
Exp. #1 0 20 40 0 Yes 87
Exp. #2 0 50 40 0 Yes 89
Exp. #3 0 100 40 0 Yes 91
Exp. #4 0 500 40 0 Yes 181
Exp. #5 0 1,000 40 0 Yes 218
Exp. #6 0 2,000 40 0 Yes 274
Exp. #7 0 3,000 40 0 Yes 309
Exp. #8 0 4,000 40 0 Yes 332
Exp. #9 0 5,000 40 0 Yes 348
Table 40: Description of the Bigrams on Pre-clustering Experiments with Document
Frequency
Exp. MR MQ Lenient Strict
Correct Acceptable Incorrect PL RL PS RS
Exp. #1 83.07% 423 0 0 100.00% 2.87% 100.00% 4.58%
Exp. #2 78.48% 299 0 0 100.00% 2.03% 100.00% 3.24%
Exp. #3 78.13% 383 0 0 100.00% 2.60% 100.00% 4.15%
Exp. #4 76.26% 1,895 1,746 2 99.94% 24.73% 52.01% 20.54%
Exp. #5 75.56% 1,832 3,471 2 99.96% 36.03% 34.53% 19.86%
Exp. #6 74.48% 1,809 3,475 2 99.96% 35.90% 34.22% 19.61%
Exp. #7 73,61% 1,828 3,477 2 99.96% 36.04% 34.44% 19.82%
Exp. #8 72.27% 1,741 3,438 2 99.96% 35.18% 33.60% 18.87%
Exp. #9 71.56% 1,742 3,447 2 99.66% 35.25% 33.55% 18.88%















Exp. #1 12.88% 5.58% 3.56% 19.37% 8.77% 5.66%
Exp. #2 9.39% 3.98% 2.52% 14.35% 6.28% 4.02%
Exp. #3 11.78% 5.07% 3.23% 17.80% 7.97% 5.13%
Exp. #4 62.15% 39.66% 29.12% 39.82% 29.45% 23.37%
Exp. #5 73.77% 52.96% 41.31% 30.09% 25.22% 21.71%
Exp. #6 73.67% 52.82% 41.17% 29.78% 24.93% 21.44%
Exp. #7 73.79% 52.98% 41.32% 30.01% 25.16% 21.66%
Exp. #8 73.06% 52.05% 40.42% 29.06% 24.17% 20.69%
Exp. #9 73.12% 52.12% 40.49% 29.04% 24.17% 20.69%
Table 42: F-Measures of the Bigrams on Pre-clustering Experiments with Document
Frequency
Exp. SimT n DF TV Expansion Nb of Features
Exp. #1 0 20 0 0.98 Yes 1,838
Exp. #2 0 50 0 0.98 Yes 1,721
Exp. #3 0 100 0 0.98 Yes 1,656
Exp. #4 0 500 0 0.98 Yes 1,528
Exp. #5 0 1,000 0 0.98 Yes 1,494
Exp. #6 0 2,000 0 0.98 Yes 1,313
Exp. #7 0 3,000 0 0.98 Yes 1,125
Exp. #8 0 4,000 0 0.98 Yes 993
Exp. #9 0 5,000 0 0.98 Yes 905
Table 43: Description of the Bigrams on Pre-clustering Experiments with Term Vari-
ance Frequency
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Exp. MR MQ Lenient Strict
Correct Acceptable Incorrect PL RL PS RS
Exp. #1 93.91% 1,812 1,753 2 99.94% 24.22% 50.79% 19.64%
Exp. #2 88.10% 1,800 1,742 2 99.94% 24.06% 50.79% 19.51%
Exp. #3 85.82% 1,797 1,737 2 99.94% 24.01% 50.82% 19.48%
Exp. #4 81.71% 1,741 1,731 2 99.94% 23.59% 50.11% 18.87%
Exp. #5 80.28% 1,708 1,702 2 99.94% 23.16% 50.05% 18.52%
Exp. #6 77.93% 1,700 1,694 2 99.94% 23.06% 50.05% 18.43%
Exp. #7 77,35% 1,716 1,712 2 99.94% 23.29% 50.03% 18.60%
Exp. #8 75.82% 1,685 1,682 2 99.94% 22.87% 50.01% 18.27%
Exp. #9 74.61% 1,129 1,129 2 99.91% 15.34% 49.95% 12.24%














Exp. #1 61.49% 38.99% 28.54% 38.56% 28.33% 22.39%
Exp. #2 61.29% 38.79% 28.37% 38.46% 28.19% 22.25%
Exp. #3 61.22% 38.72% 28.31% 38.45% 28.17% 22.22%
Exp. #4 60.66% 38.17% 27.84% 37.65% 27.42% 21.56%
Exp. #5 60.10% 37.61% 27.37% 37.34% 27.03% 21.19%
Exp. #6 59.96% 37.47% 27.25% 37.27% 26.94% 21.10%
Exp. #7 60.27% 37.77% 27.51% 37.39% 27.12% 21.28%
Exp. #8 59.71% 37.23% 27.04% 37.11% 26.76% 20.92%
Exp. #9 47.52% 26.59% 18.46% 30.91% 19.66% 14.41%
Table 45: F-Measures of the Bigrams on Pre-clustering Experiments with Term Vari-
ance Frequency
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Mixture of Unigrams + Bigrams on Pre-clustering
Experiments
When using the mixture of unigrams and bigrams as feature, Tables 46, 47, 48, 49,
50 and 51 indicate the mapping results.
Exp. SimT n DF TV Expansion Nb of Features
Exp. #1 0 20 40 0 Yes 572
Exp. #2 0 50 40 0 Yes 590
Exp. #3 0 100 40 0 Yes 613
Exp. #4 0 500 40 0 Yes 763
Exp. #5 0 1,000 40 0 Yes 809
Exp. #6 0 2,000 40 0 Yes 891
Exp. #7 0 3,000 40 0 Yes 940
Exp. #8 0 4,000 40 0 Yes 967
Exp. #9 0 5,000 40 0 Yes 998
Table 46: Description of the Mixture of Unigrams + Bigrams on Pre-clustering Ex-
periments with Document Frequency
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Exp. MR MQ Lenient Strict
Correct Acceptable Incorrect PL RL PS RS
Exp. #1 100.00% 1,859 5,437 1,049 87.42% 49.57% 22.27% 20.15%
Exp. #2 100.00% 1,858 5,363 1,249 85.25% 49.06% 21.93% 20.14%
Exp. #3 100.00% 1,857 5,296 997 87.76% 48.60% 22.78% 20.13%
Exp. #4 100.00% 1,838 5,328 1,027 87.46% 48.68% 22.43% 19.93%
Exp. #5 100.00% 1,836 4,483 1,006 86.26% 42.93% 25.06% 19.90%
Exp. #6 99.99% 1,839 4,459 1,004 86.25% 42.79% 25.18% 19.94%
Exp. #7 99,94% 1,838 4,397 1,004 86.13% 42.36% 25.39% 19.93%
Exp. #8 99.77% 1,816 4,337 997 86.05% 41.80% 25.39% 19.69%
Exp. #9 99.55% 1,824 4,344 994 86.12% 41.90% 25.46% 19.77%
Table 47: Results of the Mixture of Unigrams + Bigrams on Pre-clustering Experi-













Exp. #1 75.84% 63.27% 54.27% 21.81% 21.16% 20.54%
Exp. #2 74.29% 62.28% 53.61% 21.55% 21.01% 20.48%
Exp. #3 75.58% 62.55% 53.36% 22.20% 21.37% 20.61%
Exp. #4 75.44% 62.55% 53.42% 21.88% 21.11% 20.38%
Exp. #5 71.77% 57.33% 47.72% 23.83% 22.19% 20.76%
Exp. #6 71.68% 57.20% 47.58% 23.92% 22.25% 20.81%
Exp. #7 71.38% 56.79% 47.15% 24.07% 22.33% 20.82%
Exp. #8 71.02% 56.27% 46.59% 24.01% 22.18% 20.61%
Exp. #9 71.11% 56.38% 46.70% 24.08% 22.26% 20.70%
Table 48: F-Measures of the Mixture of Unigrams + Bigrams on Pre-clustering Ex-
periments with Document Frequency
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Exp. SimT n DF TV Expansion Nb of Features
Exp. #1 0 20 0 0.98 Yes 2,825
Exp. #2 0 50 0 0.98 Yes 2,638
Exp. #3 0 100 0 0.98 Yes 2,536
Exp. #4 0 500 0 0.98 Yes 2,373
Exp. #5 0 1,000 0 0.98 Yes 2,330
Exp. #6 0 2,000 0 0.98 Yes 2,084
Exp. #7 0 3,000 0 0.98 Yes 1,838
Exp. #8 0 4,000 0 0.98 Yes 1,648
Exp. #9 0 5,000 0 0.98 Yes 1,516
Table 49: Description of the Mixture of Unigrams + Bigrams on Pre-clustering Ex-
periments with Term Variance Frequency
Exp. MR MQ Lenient Strict
Correct Acceptable Incorrect PL RL PS RS
Exp. #1 100.00% 1,859 3,507 216 96.13% 36.45% 33.30% 20.15%
Exp. #2 100.00% 1,848 3,537 218 96.10% 36.58% 32.98% 20.03%
Exp. #3 100.00% 1,843 3,527 224 96.00% 36.48% 32.94% 19.98%
Exp. #4 100.00% 1,835 5,306 225 96.94% 48.51% 24.91% 19.89%
Exp. #5 100.00% 1,834 5,330 213 97.11% 48.67% 24.86% 19.88%
Exp. #6 99.99% 1,839 5,277 233 96.82% 48.34% 25.02% 19.94%
Exp. #7 99,94% 1,836 5,323 213 97.11% 48.64% 24.90% 19.91%
Exp. #8 99.77% 1,805 5,217 1,104 86.41% 47.71% 22.21% 19.57%
Exp. #9 99.55% 1,824 5,272 1,096 86.62% 48.21% 22.26% 19.77%
Table 50: Results of the Mixture of Unigrams + Bigrams on Pre-clustering Experi-














Exp. #1 72.42% 52.86% 41.62% 29.46% 25.11% 21.88%
Exp. #2 72.51% 52.99% 41.76% 29.20% 24.93% 21.74%
Exp. #3 72.38% 52.87% 41.64% 29.16% 24.87% 21.69%
Exp. #4 80.81% 64.67% 53.90% 23.71% 22.12% 20.73%
Exp. #5 80.99% 64.84% 54.06% 23.67% 22.09% 20.71%
Exp. #6 80.65% 64.49% 53.72% 23.81% 22.19% 20.78%
Exp. #7 80.97% 64.81% 54.03% 23.71% 22.12% 20.74%
Exp. #8 74.35% 61.47% 52.40% 21.62% 20.80% 20.04%
Exp. #9 74.71% 61.94% 52.90% 21.71% 20.94% 20.23%
Table 51: F-Measures of the Mixture of Unigrams + Bigrams on Pre-clustering Ex-
periments with Term Variance Frequency
Unigrams on Latent Semantic Analysis Experiments
Similarly the clustering experiments, unigrams only is chosen as feature to represent
snort messages and CAPEC attack ﬁelds. Tables 52, 53, 54 and 55 show the mapping
quality in terms of term frequency and tf.idf.
Exp. MR MQ Lenient Strict
Correct Acceptable Incorrect PL RL PS RS
Exp. #1 99.46% 106 4,243 110 97.53% 29.54% 2.37% 1.15%
Exp. #2 99.46% 100 5,246 110 97.98% 36.32% 1.83% 1.08%
Exp. #3 99.46% 1,796 5,241 110 98.46% 47.81% 32.94% 25.12%
Exp. #4 99.48% 1,797 5,242 122 98.29% 47.82% 25.09% 19.48%
Exp. #5 99.49% 1,797 5,236 122 98.29% 47.78% 25.11% 19.48%
Exp. #6 99.50% 1,797 5,233 122 98.29% 47.76% 25.12% 19.48%
Exp. #7 99.52% 1,797 5,233 122 98.29% 47.76% 25.12% 19.48%















Exp. #1 66.79% 45.35% 34.33% 1.95% 1.54% 1.28%
Exp. #2 73.14% 52.99% 41.55% 1.61% 1.36% 1.18%
Exp. #3 81.24% 64.36% 53.29% 23.75% 21.94% 20.39%
Exp. #4 81.16% 64.34% 53.29% 23.72% 21.93% 20.39%
Exp. #5 81.14% 64.30% 53.25% 23.74% 21.94% 20.40%
Exp. #6 81.12% 64.28% 53.23% 23.75% 21.94% 20.40%
Exp. #7 81.12% 64.28% 53.23% 23.75% 21.94% 20.40%
Table 53: F-Measures of the Unigram on Latent Semantic Analysis Experiments with
Term Frequency
Exp. MR MQ Lenient Strict
Correct Acceptable Incorrect PL RL PS RS
Exp. #1 99.46% 4 3,448 108 96.96% 23.45% 0.11% 0.04%
Exp. #2 99.46% 1,702 895 1,093 70.38% 17.64% 46.12% 18.45%
Exp. #3 99.46% 1,764 1,796 21 99.41% 24.18% 49.25% 19.12%
Exp. #4 99.48% 1,787 1,795 2 99.94% 24.33% 49.86% 19.37%
Exp. #5 99.49% 1,788 1,795 1 99.97% 24.34% 49.88% 19.38%
Exp. #6 99.50% 1,790 1,795 1 99.97% 24.35% 49.91% 19.41%
Exp. #7 99.52% 1,790 1,795 1 99.97% 24.35% 49.91% 19.41%















Exp. #1 59.65% 37.82% 27.69% 0.08% 0.06% 0.05%
Exp. #2 44.04% 28.21% 20.75% 35.48% 26.36% 20.97%
Exp. #3 61.29% 38.90% 28.50% 37.45% 27.55% 21.79%
Exp. #4 61.64% 39.14% 28.67% 37.92% 27.90% 22.07%
Exp. #5 61.66% 39.15% 28.68% 37.94% 27.92% 22.08%
Exp. #6 61.67% 39.17% 28.69% 37.97% 27.95% 22.11%
Exp. #7 61.67% 39.17% 28.69% 37.97% 27.95% 22.11%
Table 55: F-Measures of the Unigram on Latent Semantic Analysis Experiments with
TF.IDF
Bigrams on Latent Semantic Analysis Experiments
Besides using unigrams as the feature, Tables 56, 57, 58, 59 and 60 below show the
results when using bigrams only with latent semantic analysis.
Exp. SimT n DF TV Expansion Nb of Features
Exp. #1 0 100 0 0 Yes 73,350
Exp. #2 0 500 0 0 Yes 73,350
Exp. #3 0 1,000 0 0 Yes 73,350
Exp. #4 0 2,000 0 0 Yes 73,350
Exp. #5 0 3,000 0 0 Yes 73,350
Exp. #6 0 4,000 0 0 Yes 73,350
Exp. #7 0 5,000 0 0 Yes 73,350
Table 56: Description of the Bigram on Latent Semantic Analysis Experiments
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Exp. MR MQ Lenient Strict
Correct Acceptable Incorrect PL RL PS RS
Exp. #1 99.44% 1,809 3,418 0 100.00% 35.51% 34.60% 19.61%
Exp. #2 99.45% 1,793 3,460 0 100.00% 35.69% 34.13% 19.44%
Exp. #3 99.45% 1,793 3,460 3 99.94% % 35.69% 34.11% 19.44%
Exp. #4 99.47% 1,794 3,418 1 99.98% 35.41% 34.41% 19.45%
Exp. #5 99.47% 1,793 3,418 0 100.00% 35.41% 34.41% 19.44%
Exp. #6 99.49% 1,793 3,418 0 100.00% 35.40% 34.40% 19.44%
Exp. #7 99.50% 1,791 3,417 1 99.98% 35.38% 34.38% 19.42%














Exp. #1 73.35% 52.41% 40.77% 30.01% 25.03% 21.47%
Exp. #2 73.50% 52.60% 40.95% 29.65% 24.77% 21.27%
Exp. #3 73.49% 52.60% 40.95% 29.64% 24.77% 21.27%
Exp. #4 73.26% 52.30% 40.66% 29.82% 24.85% 21.30%
Exp. #5 73.26% 52.29% 40.65% 29.81% 24.84% 21.29%
Exp. #6 73.26% 52.29% 40.65% 29.81% 24.84% 21.29%
Exp. #7 73.24% 52.27% 40.63% 29.79% 24.82% 21.27%
Table 58: F-Measures of the Bigram on Latent Semantic Analysis Experiments with
Term Frequency
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Exp. MR MQ Lenient Strict
Correct Acceptable Incorrect PL RL PS RS
Exp. #1 99.44% 1,708 3,417 0 100.00% 34.82% 33.32% 18.52%
Exp. #2 99.45% 1,793 1,575 0 100.00% 22.88% 53.23% 19.44%
Exp. #3 99.45% 1,576 3,277 1 99.97% 32.97% 32.46% 17.08%
Exp. #4 99.47% 1,740 1,577 0 100.00% 22.53% 52.45% 18.86%
Exp. #5 99.47% 1,763 1,735 0 100.00% 23.76% 50.40% 19.11%
Exp. #6 99.49% 1,780 1,728 0 100.00% 23.83% 50.74% 19.30%
Exp. #7 99.50% 1,780 1,746 1 100.00% 23.95% 50.48% 19.30%














Exp. #1 72.76% 51.65% 40.04% 28.73% 23.81% 20.32%
Exp. #2 59.73% 37.24% 27.05% 39.50% 28.48% 22.26%
Exp. #3 71.08% 49.59% 38.07% 27.51% 22.39% 18.87%
Exp. #4 59.26% 36.78% 26.66% 38.68% 27.75% 21.63%
Exp. #5 60.91% 38.40% 28.04% 37.97% 27.72% 21.82%
Exp. #6 61.00% 38.49% 28.11% 38.27% 27.96% 22.03%
Exp. #7 61.16% 38.65% 28.25% 38.15% 27.92% 22.02%
Table 60: F-Measures of the Bigram on Latent Semantic Analysis Experiments with
TF.IDF
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Mixture of Unigrams + Bigrams on Latent Seman-
tic Analysis Experiments
Lastly, the mixture of unigrams and bigrams is used to represent snort messages and
attack ﬁelds. With the latent semantic analysis (LSA). Tables 61, 62, 63 and 64
indicate the mapping quality.
Exp. MR MQ Lenient Strict
Correct Acceptable Incorrect PL RL PS RS
Exp. #1 99.46% 105 4,317 109 97.59% 30.04% 2.31% 1.14%
Exp. #2 99.46% 1,811 4,359 999 86.06% 41.92% 25.26% 19.63%
Exp. #3 99.48% 1,808 5,254 1,017 87.41% % 47.98% 22.37% 19.60%
Exp. #4 99.47% 1,794 3,418 1 99.98% 35.41% 34.41% 19.45%
Exp. #5 99.47% 1,810 5,254 109 98.48% 47.99% 25.23% 19.62%
Exp. #6 99.50% 1,812 5,254 122 98.30% 48.00% 25.20% 19.64%
Exp. #7 99.52% 1,811 5,254 122 98.30% 48.00% 25.19% 19.63%
Table 61: Results of the Mixture of Unigrams + Bigrams on Latent Semantic Analysis













Exp. #1 67.32% 45.94% 34.87% 1.91% 1.52% 1.26%
Exp. #2 71.09% 56.38% 46.71% 23.89% 22.09% 20.55%
Exp. #3 66.47% 50.57% 40.82% 26.17% 23.25% 20.91%
Exp. #4 73.26% 52.30% 40.66% 29.82% 24.85% 21.30%
Exp. #5 81.36% 64.53% 53.47% 23.86% 22.07% 20.53%
Exp. #6 81.27% 64.51% 53.48% 23.85% 22.08% 20.55%
Exp. #7 81.27% 64.50% 53.47% 23.84% 22.07% 20.54%
Table 62: F-Measures of the Mixture of Unigrams + Bigrams on Latent Semantic
Analysis Experiments with Term Frequency
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Exp. MR MQ Lenient Strict
Correct Acceptable Incorrect PL RL PS RS
Exp. #1 99.46% 6 3,462 111 96.89% 23.56% 0.16% 0.07%
Exp. #2 99.46% 65 3,431 958 78.49% 23.75% 1.45% 0.70%
Exp. #3 99.46% 1,771 927 97 96.52% 18.33% 63.36% 19.20%
Exp. #4 99.48% 1,740 3,271 3 99.94% 34.04% 34.70% 18.86%
Exp. #5 99.49% 1,745 3,452 0 100.00% 35.31% 33.57% 18.92%
Exp. #6 99.50% 1,747 3,437 0 100.00% 35.22% 33.69% 18.94%
Exp. #7 99.50% 1,752 2,554 0 100.00% 29.25% 40.68% 18.99%














Exp. #1 59.72% 37.90% 27.76% 0.12% 0.09% 0.07%
Exp. #2 53.72% 36.46% 27.60% 1.20% 0.95% 0.79%
Exp. #3 52.08% 30.81% 21.87% 43.40% 29.47% 22.31%
Exp. #4 72.05% 50.79% 39.21% 29.71% 24.44% 20.76%
Exp. #5 73.18% 52.19% 40.55% 29.07% 24.20% 20.73%
Exp. #6 73.10% 52.09% 40.46% 29.15% 24.25% 20.76%
Exp. #7 67.40% 45.26% 34.07% 33.12% 25.90% 21.26%
Table 64: F-Measures of the Mixture of Unigrams + Bigrams on Latent Semantic
Analysis Experiments with TF.IDF
105
